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Implementation Guideline. The enclosure addresses the NRC comments  on 
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The guideline is considered to be a work-in-progress  document.  There are 
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and categorization of structures, systems, and components and PRA quality.  In 
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used by a licensee implementing risk-informed improvements  to the special 
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2001 Option 2 Workshop  to discuss the inclusion of Part 54 in Option 2, and to 
provide clarifications  on the guidance.  We believe that such an interaction will 
result in a more productive and constructive workshop.  
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1.  BACKGROUND 
The regulations for design and operation of US nuclear plants define a specific set of 
accidents that the plants must tolerate without incurring significant public health impacts.  
This is known as a deterministic regulatory basis because there is no consideration of the 
probability of occurrence of the design basis accidents - it is "determined"  they will 
occur, and the plant is designed and operated to prevent and mitigate such accidents..  
This deterministic regulatory basis was developed over thirty years ago, absent data from 
actual plant operation.  It is based on the principal that the deterministic accidents would 
serve as a surrogate for the broad set of transients and accidents that could be realistically 
expected over the life of the plant.  
Since the inception of this regulatory basis, over 2500 reactor years of operation have 
been accumulated in the US (over 9000 reactor years worldwide),  with a corresponding 
body of data relative to actual transients, accidents, and plant equipment performance.  
Further, each US plant has performed a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA), which uses 
these data, and models a large number of potential accident sequences (including 
sequences not considered in the deterministic regulatory basis) to estimate the overall risk 
from plant operation.  PRAs describe risk in terms of the frequency of reactor core 
damage and/or significant offsite release.  Insights from PRAs reveal that certain plant 
equipment important to the deterministic regulatory basis is of little significance to 
safety.  Conversely,  certain plant equipment is important to safety  but is  not included in 
the deterministic regulatory basis.  
Risk insights have been considered in the promulgation of new regulatory requirements 
(station blackout rule, anticipated transients without scram rule, maintenance  rule).  In 
1998, the Commission directed the NRC staff to develop rulemaking to more broadly 
consider risk insights  as the basis for fundamental  reform to the deterministic regulatory 
approach.  This guideline addresses the use of risk insights to define the scope of plant 
equipment subject to special regulatory treatment provisions.  
1.1  REGULATORY  REFORM INITIATIVE 
Current NRC regulations establish that plant equipment necessary to meet the 
deterministic regulatory basis is categorized as "safety  related", and is subject to a broad 
set of "special treatment"' regulations (controls).  Other plant equipment is categorized 
as "non safety related", and is not subject to special regulatory treatment.  There is a set 
of nonsafety related equipment that is subject to the regulations and a degree of special 
treatment.  This set is often referred to as "important-to-safety." 
1 Special treatment requirements are current requirements imposed on structures, systems, and 
components that go beyond industry-established  requirements for equipment classified as 
commercial grade that are intended by the NRC to provide additional confidence that the equipment 
is capable of meeting its functional  requirements under design basis conditions.  These additional 
special treatment requirements include additional  design considerations,  qualification, change 
control, documentation, reporting, maintenance, testing, surveillance,  and quality assurance 
requirements.
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The objective of regulatory reform is to adjust the  scope of equipment subject to special 
regulatory treatment (controls) in light of risk insights from PRAs and plant operation.  
This will result in adjustment of controls based on the safety-significance  of the 
equipment.  
When issued,  10 CFR 50.69, will provide  an option for licensees to implement a risk
informed approach for regulations that establish special treatment requirements for plant 
structures, systems and components (SSCs) based on safety significance.  Table  1.1  lists 
the special treatment regulations that would be subject to the optional risk-informed 
approach.  10 CFR 50.69  defines four categories of SSCs, based on existing safety 
classification  and risk significance, and establishes controls  as a function of the 
categorization.  The special treatment regulations in Table 1.1  would not in themselves be 
changed.  However, the scope of applicability,  and the manner in which the special 
treatment provisions are implemented, would be revised as defined in  10 CFR 50.69.  
The decision to adopt a risk-informed approach for categorizing structures, systems and 
components is voluntary.  Each licensee will make its determination  on whether to adopt 
a risk-informed  approach to regulation based on the estimated benefit.  
The NRC rulemaking plan does not replace the existing "safety related" and "non safety 
related"  classifications. Rather, 10 CFR 50.69 provides that the each existing 
classification category can be divided into two categories based on high or low safety 
significance.  The categorization is depicted in Figure 1.1-1.  
The application of special treatment regulations and controls is a function of the 
categorization.  Regulatory requirements  are applied for all categories except RISC 4.  
The existing special treatment provisions for RISC  1 and RISC-2 are maintained or 
enhanced.  RISC 3 equipment would be subject to the licensee's standard commercial 
(balance-of-plant) controls with monitoring to provide reasonable assurance that the 
function directly referenced in the regulations or in the safety analyses required by 
regulation will be satisfied.
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Figure 1.1-1 
Risk Informed Safety Classifications (RISC)
High 
Low
Safety Related Non-Safety Related
DETERMINISTIC  SIGNIFICANCE 
1.2  CATEGORIZATION PATHWAYS 
The risk-informed classification  scheme allocates each SSC in the plant to one of four 
classifications (RISC 1 - 4).  Figure  1.2-1  provides a graphical depiction of the 
classification pathways utilized in this process.  The existing safety related components in 
the plant are classified either via pathway  1 to RISC-1  (for safety significant SSCs) or via 
pathway 2 to RISC-3 (for low safety significant SSCs).  Pathway  1 is the default pathway 
for all safety related SSCs.  That is, unless a compelling case can be made that the safety 
related SSC is low safety significant, then it is classified  as RISC-1.  In cases where a 
risk-informed process can demonstrate that the safety related SSC is of low safety 
significance, it is classified as RISC-3.  
All other SSCs (non-safety related) are classified on either pathway 3  to RISC-2 (for 
safety significant SSCs) or via pathway 4 to RISC-4 (for low safety significant SSCs).  In 
this case, pathway 4 is the default pathway for non-safety related SSCs.  That is, unless a 
compelling case can be made that the non-safety related SSC is safety significant, then it 
is classified as RISC-4.  In cases where a risk-informed process can demonstrate that the 
non-safety related SSC is safety significant, it is classified as RISC-2.  
The only time that an SSC would move via another pathway would be if it was found to 
be misclassified initially.  In that case, the licensee would perform  a §50.59 evaluation to 
reclassify the SSC as nonsafety-related.
3
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Certain plant equipment is not considered  safety related in the existing classification scheme, but 
is subject to certain special regulatory requirements.  Examples are, "important to safety"  SSCs, 
whose failure could affect the function of safety related SSCs, or "augmented  quality" SSCs that 
require some subset of "safety related "regulatory treatment (e.g., many plants consider fire 
protection SSCs as augmented quality).  
For the purposes of regulatory reform, these "important to safety"  SSCs as described above enter 
into the categorization process as "non safety related".  However, their default pathway is not into 
RISC 4.  Rather, the default pathway is into RISC 2, with the assumption that the existing 
regulatory requirements would be maintained,  absent compelling justification to change them.  
Thus, requirements  for these "important-to-safety"  SSCs would not change. If the risk informed 
classification process determines that these SSCs have low safety significance, they may be 
classified to RISC 4.  
Figure 1.2-1 
CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION  OF CLASSIFICATION  PATHWAYS
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1.3  IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
This document provides detailed  implementation guidance for  10 CFR 50.69..  Plants that follow 
the guideline should be able to implement risk-informed regulation with minimal NRC review.  
Since this guidance is used to effect a change to the plant's licensing basis, it follows the 
principles of NRC Regulatory Guide  1.174, as follows: 
1.  Proposed increases in risk, if any, are small and are consistent with the Commission's safety 
goal policy statement.  
2.  The process will result in changes that are consistent with defense in depth philosophy 
3.  The process will result in changes that maintain sufficient safety margins 
4.  Performance measurement strategies are used to monitor the change 
The process considers the current regulatory requirements, and all available risk information, to 
determine categorization and treatment of SSCs.  The process is effected through the use of a 
dedicated panel of plant personnel, the integrated decisionmaking  panel (IDP).  To implement this 
process, the licensee must have performed a PRA that estimates core damage frequency (and 
large early release frequency) due to internally initiated events and internal flooding.  All plants 
have used methods to analyze other important risk contributors, such as seismic risk, fire risk, 
other external event risks (high winds, tornadoes, aircraft impact, etc.) during power operation, 
and risk during outage conditions.  These methods may involve use of a PRA to quantify these 
risk impacts, or may involve simplified analyses or qualitative methods.  Quantification of non
internal event risk is not a requirement for implementation 2, but would be expected to result in 
additional benefit.  
The process for implementation involves four elements: 
1.  Selection of scope of SSCs to be addressed 
2.  Categorization of SSCs into high or low risk significance 
3.  Determination of special treatment requirements  based on categorization 
4.  Monitoring of implementation 
The first element involves determining the plant systems to which the revised approach would be 
applied.  Plant systems that can impact PRA initiating events and accident mitigation are 
candidate systems for appliciaion of the process.  Certain plant systems have regulatory 
requirements  that have bases other than protection of public health and safety from potential 
reactor accidents (e.g., the radwaste processing system).  These systems, and their associated 
regulatory requirements, are not within the scope of the process.  
The approach may be applied  to all candidate systems, or may be applied to selected systems.  
The preferred approach is to apply the revised categorization  and treatment provisions to all 
candidate systems.  Selective implementation will incur complexities resulting from the need to 
maintain two separate regulatory programs.  However, selective implementation may be 
undertaken provided the application meets the four Reg Guide  1.174 principles listed above.  
2As discussed in NRC Regulatory Guide  1.174, quantification of non-internal event risk may be necessary if 
the aggregate risk impact exceeds the "very small change" guidelines for CDF and LERF
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The second principal activity is the categorization of the SSCs according to safety significance.  
Treatment requirements  for SSCs will be dependent on this safety classification.  This report 
establishes an integrated process, which relies upon the insights from plant-specific risk analyses 
and other engineering and operating inputs for use in the categorization of SSCs.  The 
categorization  process has been constructed to build on the previous risk-informed categorization 
activities.  A licensee is not required to repeat activities that have already been completed as part 
of a previous risk-informed categorization process.  
The necessity of addressing each component, or each part of a component is determined by each 
licensee based on the anticipated benefit.  A licensee may determine that it is sufficient only to 
perform system or subsystem analyses.  In such cases,  all the components within the boundaries 
of the subsystem or system would be governed by the same set of safety-significant functions.  
Each licensee has the option, based on the estimated benefit, of performing additional  engineering 
and system analyses to identify specific component level or piece part functions and attributes.  
The regulatory change process (10  CFR 50.59) applies only to activities that are encompassed by 
the 10 CFR 50.2 definition of design bases or described in the final safety analysis report.  In a 
risk-informed regulatory environment, management  focus should be on operational  activities and 
equipment that have safety significance, which may not necessarily comport with the aspects of 
the facility described  in the final safety analyses report.  For example, containment venting is not 
described the final safety analysis reports for most BWRs, but may be a risk significant activity 
for some plants.  As a result, Section 50.69 includes a risk-informed change control process  for 
risk-informed  SSCs and activities.  The guidance for the new change control process for beyond 
design bases events is included as part of this guidance document in the section on treatment.  
A licensee, in its application to adopt a set of regulations under §50.69, would make a 
commitment to implement the §50.69 categorization  process and special treatment requirements 
in accordance with this guideline. Changes to the SSC categorization  process and SSC treatment 
as described  in this guideline would be governed by NEI 99-04, Guideline  for Managing  NRC 
Commitment Changes.  
1.4  REFERENCES 
This guidance was developed  considering numerous inputs includi,,g the current deterministic 
design basis of the plants, existing regulations, defense-in-depth, preservation of safety margins, 
and both qualitative and quantitative risk evaluations.  This is consistent with the NRC's PRA 
Policy Statement issued in August, 1995,  and the NRC white paper, Risk-Informed and 
Performance-Based  Regulation, issued in March,  1999, which states, "...a risk-informed, 
performance-based  regulation is an approach in which risk insights, engineering analysis and 
judgment including the principle of defense-in-depth  and the incorporation of safety margins, and 
performance history are used ..." 
Since 1991  the industry and the NRC has developed background documents and guidance for the 
application of risk-informed applications.  Several of these documents had significant impact on 
the development  of this guidance including:
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*  EPRI TR-105396, PSA Applications Guide, 
*  Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach  for using Probabilistic  Risk Assessment in Risk
Informed Decisions  On Plant-Specific  Changes to the Licensing Basis, 
*  NRC SECY 99-256, Rulemaking Plan For  Risk-Informing Special Treatment Requirements, 
*  NUMARC  93-01,  Industry Guideline  for Monitoring  the Effectiveness of  Maintenance  at 
Nuclear  Power Plants 
*  NUMARC  91-06,  Guidelines  for Industry  Actions to Assess Shutdown Management 
*  NRC Regulatory Guides 1.175,  1.176,  1.177 and 1.178, 
*  ASME Code Case OMN-3, Requirements  for Safety Significance Categorization  of 
Components using Risk-Insights  for Inservice Testing of  L WR Power  Plants 
Each of these documents  recommends the use of an integrated decision process that combines 
operating experience, engineering  analyses, expert opinions, structured qualitative analyses, and 
quantitative evaluations.  The approach  described in this guidance is consistent with the processes 
and approaches described in these referenced  documents.
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Table 1.1 
Special treatment regulations subject to 
optional risk-informed  approach of 
10 CFR 50.69 
50.34, Contents of applications; technical information (FSAR) 
50.44, Standards  for combustible gas control system in light-water-cooled power reactors 
50.49, Environmental  qualification 
50.54, Conditions of licenses (in reference to Quality Assurance Programs only) 
50.55, Conditions of construction permits 
50.55a, Codes and standards 
50.62, Requirements  for reduction of risk from anticipated transients without scram (ATWS) 
events for light-water-cooled  nuclear power plants.  
50.63,  Loss of all alternating current power.  
50.65, Monitoring effectiveness of maintenance 
50.72/50.73, Reporting 
Appendix A, General Design Criteria 
GDC 1, Quality standards and records 
GDC 2, Design bases for protection against natural phenomena 
GDC 3, Fire protection 
GDC 4, Environmental  and dynamic effects design bases 
GDC 37, Testing of emergency core cooling system 
GDC 40, Testing of containment heat removal system 
GDC 42, Inspection of containment atmosphere cleanup systems 
GDC 43, Testing of containment atmosphere cleanup systems 
GDC 45,  Inspection of cooling water system 
GDC 46, Testing of cooling water system 
Appendix B,  Quality Assurance 
Appendix J, Containment  leakage 
Appendix R, Fire Protection 
Appendix S, Seismic 
Part 21,  Reporting of defects and noncompliance 
Part 52, Advanced Reac',ors 
Part 54, License Renewal 
Part  100, Appendix A, Seismic
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2.  CATEGORIZATION PROCESS 
2.1  GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
Before describing the categorization  process, it is useful to understand first the objectives, 
which drove the development of the process, and the guiding principles, which govern 
the process and criteria.  
The objective of this guidance is to establish the process and criteria for determining the 
SSCs that require special treatment.  By defining the SSCs that require special  treatment, 
those that do not require special treatment are identified by exception.  The process and 
criteria are intended to be sufficiently clear and robust such that if a licensee's program 
meets the criteria there is not a need for prior NRC review and approval of the plant
specific program.  
As the process and criteria were developed a number of guiding principles were used to 
steer the process.  These principles are: 
*  Applicable Risk Assessment Information Will Be Utilized 
As a result of the Individual Plant Examination program and a number of industry efforts, 
all licensees have gained an appreciation for the degree of susceptibility to and the 
performance of their plants under severe accident conditions.  The IPE process required 
the evaluation,  at least qualitatively, of the risks during power operations of a spectrum  of 
hazards including internal events, fires, earthquakes,  high winds, and floods.  Industry 
initiatives have led to the institution of shutdown safety programs aimed at managing 
risks during low power and shutdown conditions.  
Quantitative probabilistic risk analyses have been performed  for at least some of these 
hazards.  In cases where quantitative  analyses are not available, at least screening 
evaluations have been performed.  Quantitative analyses are highly amenable to 
identifying the most (or least) significant SSCs.  However, many of the screening 
analyses, both quantitative and qualitative, can also yield plant specific information 
which can be used in determining the safety significance of an SSC.  For this reason, all 
available plant-specific risk assessment information is expected to be brought to bear in 
the categorization process.  
*  If No PRA Information Exists Related to A Particular Hazard or Operating 
Mode, Deterministic or Qualitative Information Will Be Relied Upon 
In cases where PRAs or other quantitative analyses are not available, deterministic or 
qualitative information will be relied upon.  For example, if a plant does not have a 
tornado risk assessment, then the features of the plant which were designed specifically to 
protect systems or components from failure during a tornado will be considered safety 
significant.  This may be conservative for some plants.  In those cases, the licensee
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always has the option to perform  a risk assessment of the hazard to determine if those 
SSCs would truly be considered safety significant.  As a result, plants with more plant
specific PRA information available may find more SSCs being classified  as low safety 
significant.  
*  The Classification Process Should Employ a Blended Approach Considering Both 
Quantitative PRA Information and Qualitative Information 
Consistent with the principles of Regulatory Guide  1.174, the implementation  of a risk
informed approach includes both the consideration of quantitative information gained the 
performance of plant specific PRAs and qualitative information regarding defense-in
depth and safety margins.  
o  The Principles of the NRC's Risk-Informed Approach to Regulations, As 
Embodied In Reg. Guide 1.174 Will Be Maintained 
The risk-informed approach described herein is intended to utilize the principles of the 
NRC's risk-informed approach to regulation: 
1.  The Proposed Change Meets the Regulations  -The changes in special treatment will 
be made under the NRC's proposed  1  OCFR50.69.  
2.  The Proposed Change Is Consistent With The Defense-In-Depth Philosophy - The re
classification and treatment process provides reasonable assurance that safety 
functions are maintained.  Therefore, defense in depth will not be impacted.  As part 
of the classification process, a review is performed which assesses the level of 
defense in depth without credit for SSCs defined as low safety significant.  In 
addition, the impact of common cause failure of SSCs, which are modeled in a PRA 
and are classified  as low safety significant, is considered in the treatment.  
3.  The Proposed Change Maintains Sufficient Safety Margins  -The re-classification and 
treatment process provides reasonable assurance that safety functions are maintained.  
Therefore, safety margins will not be impacted.  
4.  Any Incitra-;es in Core Damage Frequency or Risk Should Be Small and Consistent 
With the Intent Of The Commission's Safety Goal Policy Statement - The re
classification  and treatment process provides reasonable assurance that safety 
functions are maintained.  Risk sensitivity studies will be used to demonstrate that no 
significant change in CDF and LERF will be expected.  
5.  The Impact Of The Proposed Change Should Be Monitored Using Performance 
Measurement  Strategies - Performance monitoring strategies will employed as part of 
the treatment process.  
e  Where An Engineering Basis for Reclassification  Can Not Be Developed, No 
Change In Treatment of the SSC Will Occur
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As discussed in Sectionl,  it is anticipated that many safety related SSCs will be 
categorized as RISC-1.  Likewise, it is anticipated that many non-safety related SSCs will 
be categorized  as RISC-4.  An engineering basis, subject to evaluation by an Integrated 
Decision-making Panel (IDP), is required for selection of other pathways.  This 
engineering basis must be developed from a risk-informed perspective.  
The Attribute(s) Which Make An SSC Safety Significant Will Be Factored Into 
Treatment 
The results of the numerous plant-specific PRAs which have been performed indicate that 
the attributes of an SSC which make it safety significant may or may not be the attributes 
which governed its original safety related classification.  For example, some safety 
related SSCs have functions for beyond design basis events, which were not considered 
in the original design.  BWR containment vent valves are a good example of this.  They 
are generally containment isolation valves designed to assure the containment is isolated 
in the event of a design basis accident.  However, most BWR PRAs would find that the 
function of opening to allow venting for containment pressure control  to be safety 
significant.  In other cases, non-safety related SSCs which were not credited in design 
basis analyses are found to be risk significant (e.g., feedwater  and condenser in some 
BWRs, startup feedwater pumps in some PWRs).  
As a result, the categorization process focuses on the attributes that define why an SSC is 
safety significant.  This allows the special treatment requirements to focus on those 
attributes that are most important.  
*  The Treatment For RISC-3 SSCs Will Be Designed to Maintain  Function 
The overall philosophy of the treatment changes for safety related, low safety significant 
SSCs (RISC-3) is to provide reasonable assurance that the safety functions will be 
available.  This allows continued confidence that the design basis of the plant can be met 
and reduces the need to compute any estimated increase in risk due to the change in 
classification.  
2.2  SAFETY SIGNIFICANT ATTRIBUTES OF SSCs 
One of the central concepts of the risk-informed safety categorization process is 
performance attributes.  The risk-informed performance of many SSCs is the same (or 
similar) as that required in the design basis.  At one time, it was expected that the design 
basis attributes would envelope  all performance attributes.  In many cases, this is true.  
For example, stroke times for valves are generally set based on conservative thermal 
hydraulic analyses which lead to performance requirements  far in excess of those which a 
PRA would require (valves required to open in seconds when the PRA may indicate that 
minutes are available).  In other cases, SSCs can have significantly different performance 
needs for severe accident mitigation.  SSCs may be used in a unique manner or the 
conditions under which performance is desired may be more severe than the design basis
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considered.  For example, pressurizer PORVs have  a design basis to open to relieve 
primary system pressure.  While that function may (or may not) be important in a PRA, 
another function not considered in the design basis is likely to be: open on demand to 
support bleed and feed cooling of the RCS in the event of loss of all secondary cooling.  
The process described in this guideline addresses this issue by identifying the attributes 
of SSC performance, which make the SSC safety significant so that the special treatment 
requirements can be focused on those attributes. Safety-significant  functional 
(performance) attributes are identified for each structure; system or component based on 
the SSCs contribution to the safety-significant function.  
Functional attributes can be broadly classified into four major categories: 
"  SSC Function 
Some SSCs perform an entirely different function in severe accident mitigation than 
their design basis function  (e.g., Valves required close for design basis, open for 
severe accidents).  
"* Performance Attributes 
The function of the SSC is the same, but the SSC is expected to perform in a capacity 
beyond design basis limits (e.g.,  containment ultimate pressure capability) 
"* Environmental  Factors 
Some SSCs are credited in PRAs as being capable of operating outside the design 
basis envelope.  (e.g., pumps expected to operate without room cooling) 
"  Actuation Requirements 
Often, due to less stringent performance  requirements, some SSCs are credited in 
PRAs based on manual actuation (e.g., timely manual actuation of injection systems)
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2.3  OVERALL APPROACH 
The overall  approach to the risk-informed categorization process described  in this 
guideline involves a four-step process.  Figure 2.3-1  provides an overview of this process.  
Figure 2.3-1 
Risk-informed  Classification  Process
Step 1: 
Assembly of 
Plant-Specific 
Risk 
Information 
Resources: 
'  Internal Events  PRA 
/  Fire PRA/FIVE 
V  Seismic PRA/Seismic 
Margins 
V1 External  Events PRA/ 
IPEEE  Screening 
V/  Shutdown  PSA/ 
Shutdown  Safety 
Management 
/  SSC Design Basis 
Information
Step 2: 
>  Compilation of 
Risk Insights 
& Safety 
Significant 
Attributes 
Includes: 
"/  Risk Significance 
Assessments 
"I  Integrated Risk 
Significance  Assessment 
,  Initial Identification  of 
Safety Significance 
"I  Identification of Safety 
Significant  Attributes 
"  Basis for Low Safety 
Significance for Safety 
Related  SSCs
Step 3: 
IDP Review & 
Classification.  
Recommend 
Changes In 
Treatment 
Considers: 
I  Risk Insights 
/  Safety Significant 
Attributes 
.1  Operating History 
V1 Deterministic 
Considerations 
I  Defense-in-Depth 
"/  Safety Margins 
Determines: 
"I  Specific Changes  In 
Treatment 
"I  Monitoring
Step 4: 
Evaluation 
of 
Recommended 
Changes
Includes: 
"I  Qualitative 
Assessment of 
Treatment  Impacts 
"/  Risk Sensitivity 
Studies 
"/  Evaluation of 
Monitoring 
Effectiveness
The first step in the risk-informed categorization  process involves the assembly of the 
relevant plant-specific  risk information.  In general,  as a result of the IPE process most 
utilities have plant-specific analyses in the following areas: 
"* Internal  Events PRA 
"* Fire PRA/FIVE 
"* Seismic PRA/Seismic Margins 
"* External Events PRA/IPEEE Screening 
"* Shutdown PRA/Shutdown  Safety Management 
These analyses or programs may represent the current plant design and operation, but 
even if they have not been kept up to date, they provide insights regarding the plant
specific risk impacts of potential hazards.  
The core of the safety significance process is in the second step: Compilation of Risk 
Insights & Safety Significant Attributes.  This involves the evaluation of each structure, 
system, and component with respect to its safety significance in five hazard areas:
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"* Internally Initiated Events (including Internal Floods) 
"* Fires 
"* Seismic Events 
"* Other External Events (e.g.,  tornadoes, high winds, chemical releases, etc.) 
"* Shutdown operations 
These areas correspond to the topical risk analyses (or other assessments) already 
performed by utilities.  This step involves the assessment of SSC risk significance  in each 
of these areas, development of an integrated risk significance  across those areas with 
quantitative  assessments, development of initial recommendations on safety significance 
classification  for input to the IDP, identification of the safety significant attributes of 
SSCs identified as safety significant (i.e., RISC-1  and RISC-2) and development of bases 
for the low safety significance of safety related evaluated.  This step will be performed 
largely by personnel familiar with the plant-specific analyses gathered in Step 1 (i.e.,  the 
plant PRA group).  
The third step in the risk-informed categorization process involves the review of the 
results of Step 2 by the Integrated Decision-making  Panel.  The purpose of this panel is to 
review the risk information developed in Step 2 and evaluate other considerations, which 
are part of a risk-informed process.  The result of the IDP review is the classification of 
SSCs and identification  of the changes in treatment and monitoring.  The IDP is a 
multidisciplinary team of experts which can bring together an understanding of design, 
operational, licensing, and risk perspectives.  
The fourth and final step in the process is the evaluation of the risk sensitivity of the 
recommended  changes.  This step involves both qualitative and quantitative assessments 
of the anticipated impact of the proposed changes.  In general,  since one of the guiding 
principles of this process is that changes in treatment should not degrade performance for 
RISC-3  SSCs, and RISC-2 SSCs would be expected to maintain or improve in 
performance, it is anticipated that there would be little, if any, net increase in risk.  This 
assessment involves the review of the specific treatment changes recommended by the 
IDP to identify the anticipated impact on a qualitative basis.  For those cases where some 
degradation in performance may be possible, sensitivity studies will be performed using 
available PRA information.  Any identified monitoring will also be evaluated to assure 
that degradations  will be identified appropriately.  Should significant risk impacts be 
identified, then those would be referred back to the IDP for further evaluation.  
Section 2.4 provides a more detailed description of each step of this process.
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2.4  SPECIFIC GUIDANCE 
This section provides a description of the specific processes and criteria to be applied in 
the performance of risk-informed safety categorization.  The outline of the section 
follows the four step process described  in Section 2.3: 
"* Assembly of Plant-Specific Risk  Information (Sec.  2.4.1) 
"* Compilation of Risk Insights & Safety Significant Attributes (Sec. 2.4.2) 
"* IDP Review & Classification.  Recommend Changes In Treatment (Sec.  2.4.3) 
"* Risk Evaluation of Recommended Changes (Sec. 2.4.4) 
2.4.1  Assembly of Plant-Specific Risk Information 
The first step in the categorization  process is the collection and assembly of plant-specific 
resources that can provide input to the determination  of safety significance.  
2.4.1.1 Documentation Resources 
Like all risk-informed processes, the categorization process relies upon input from both 
standard design and licensing information and risk analyses and insights.  
The understanding of the risk insights for a specific plant are generally captured in the 
following analyses: 
"* Internal  Events PRA, 
"* Fire PRA or FIVE Analysis, 
"* Seismic PRA or Seismic Margin Assessment, 
"* External Hazards PRA(s) or IPEEE Screening Assessment of External Hazards,  and 
"* Shutdown PRA or Shutdown Safety Program developed per NUMARC  91-06.  
Examples of resources that can provide information on the safety classification and 
design basis attributes of SSCs include: 
"* Master Equipment Lists (provides safety related designation) 
"* UFSAR 
"* Design Basis Documents 
"* 10 CFR 50.2 Assessments 
2.4.1.2 Use of PRA Information 
At a minimum, a PRA modeling the internal initiating events at full power operations 
must be used to provide input to the IDP.  At a minimum, the PRA must be capable of 
quantifying  core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF)  for 
power operations due to internal events and must reasonably reflect the as-built and as
operated plant.  A reasonable reflection of the plant is assumed to exist if the PRA has
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been updated within the previous two years to reflect design and operating history of 
important systems/components  and significant design and procedural  changes and 
Maintenance  Rule a(l) SSCs added since the last update have been reviewed to assure 
that the results and insights are not expected to be affected.  Assessments of other hazards 
and modes of plant operation will be reviewed to assure that the results and/or insights 
are applicable  to the as-built, as-operated plant.  -PRAs provide an integrated means to 
assess relative significance.  In cases where applicable quantitative  analyses are not 
available, the categorization process will generally identify more SSCs as safety 
significant than in cases where full scope PRAs are available.  
A PRA used in this process should be performed in a manner that is consistent with 
accepted practices, in terms of the scope and level of detail for the hazards  evaluated.  
One effective approach to ensuring quality is a peer review of the PRA.  Industry PRA 
certification programs, such as NEI 00-02  (Ref. 8), and PRA cross-comparison  studies 
can be used to help ensure appropriate scope, level of detail, and quality of the PRA.  
The licensee should assure that documentation exists for the review process, the 
qualification of the reviewers, the summarized review findings, and resolutions to these 
findings, where applicable.  Based on the peer review or certification  process and on the 
findings from this process, the licensee should justify why the PRA is adequate  for this 
application in terms of scope and quality.  One product of the certification process is a 
series of grades in a spectrum of technical areas.  Areas with low grades should be 
reviewed  and evaluated to assess whether changes in the PRA are necessary.  
Consistent with other engineering analyses conducted to justify changes to a plant's 
licensing basis, quality assurance activities are appropriate for the categorization process.  
In this regard, it is expected that for traditional engineering analyses (e.g., deterministic 
engineering calculations) existing provisions for quality assurance (e.g., Appendix B to 
10 CFR Part 50, for safety-related  SSCs) will apply and provide the appropriate quality 
needed.  Likewise, when a PRA is used to provide insights into the integrated decision
making panel, it is expected that the PRA will have been subject to quality control.  
The following, in conjunction with the other guidance contained in this guideline, 
describes methods  acceptable to ensure that the pertinent quality assurance requirements 
of Appendix  B to  10 CFR Part 50 are met and that the PRA is of sufficient quality to be 
used for regulatory decisions: 
"* Use personnel qualified for the analysis.  
"* Use procedures that ensure control of documentation, including revisions, and provide 
for independent review, verification, or checking of calculations and information used 
in the analyses (an independent peer review or certification program can be used as an 
important element in this process).  
"* Provide documentation and maintain records in accordance with accepted practices.
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"* Provide for an independent audit function to verify quality (an independent peer 
review or certification program can be used for this purpose).  
"  Use procedures that ensure appropriate attention and corrective actions are taken if 
assumptions, analyses, or information used in previous decision-making  is changed 
(e.g., licensee voluntary action) or determined to be in error.  
Any existing PRA or analysis can be utilized to support the categorization process, 
provided it can be shown that the appropriate quality provisions have been met.  If the 
PRA or other analysis has not been updated to reflect all current design and operating 
conditions, it can still be used as long as the limitations of the study are considered  in the 
initial classification  and identified to the IDP for consideration in the final classification.  
2.4.1.3 Characterization of PRA Quality 
PRA is a very robust technology which provides unparalleled insight into the role that 
SSCs play in plant safety.  However, like most technologies, PRA has limitations.  The 
figure below defines the approach to be employed in assuring that quality of PRA 
information employed in the categorization of SSCs 
The primary PRA input into the categorization  process is the internal  events PRA.  This 
PRA is expected to meet accepted  attributes and characteristics and be subject to a peer 
review.  The Industry PRA Peer Review Process (NEI 00-02) represents an acceptable 
approach to assuring the quality of the base internal events PRA.  The NEI 00-02 peer 
review provides several outputs which are useful in characterizing the quality of the PRA.  
The first output is a set of element grades, ranging from  1 to 4, which provide an 
consensus assessment by the peer review team of the usability of the PRA in applications.  
In the terms of the NEI 00-02 grading scheme, the Option 2 categorization process is a 
Grade 3 application.  Thus, elements receiving a grade of 3 or 4 should be expected to be 
sufficient to support the categorization process.  Elements receiving a grade of 1 or 2 
should be reviewed by the PRA team to determine the whether the PRA needs to be 
revised to address the peer review findings or if additional sensitivity studies are called 
for as part of the categorization process.
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PROCESS FOR ASSURING  PRA QUALITY 
IN OPTION 2 CATEGORIZATION
The second important output of the NEI 00-02 peer review process are the Fact and 
Observations (F&Os) which document strengths and weaknesses of specific aspects of 
the PRA.  F&Os which identify weaknesses are classified with an importance ranging 
from A to D, where A is most important and D is generally editorial.  All F&Os in 
categories A and B should be reviewed and dispositioned by either:
S 
S 
S
Incorporating appropriate changes into the PRA model prior to use, 
Identifying appropriate sensitivity studies to address the issue identified, or 
Providing adequate justification for the original model.
Other PRA analyses, such as Fire PRAs, Seismic PRAs, and Shutdown PRAs, should be 
reviewed to assure that (1) none of the internal event peer certification findings invalidate 
the results and insights, (2) the study appropriately reflects the as-built, as-operated plant 
and (3) any new PRA information (e.g., RCP seal LOCA assumptions, physical 
phenomena, etc.) does not invalidate the result.  
The results of the internal  events peer review and the review of the other PRA analyses to 
be used should be summarized in a characterization of PRA quality.  This
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characterization  will be provided to the IDP as a basis for the adequacy of the PRA 
information used in the categorization  process and will be summarized in the submittal to 
the NRC.  At a minimum, this characterization  should include the following: 
Internal  Events PRA 
"*  A basis for why the internal  events PRA reflects the as-built, as-operated 
plant.  
"*  A high level summary of the results of the peer certification of the internal 
events PRA including elements which received grades lower than 3.  
"*  The disposition of any peer review fact and observations (F&Os) classified  as 
A or B importance.  
"*  Identification of and basis for any sensitivity analyses necessary to address 
identified elements and F&Os.  
Other PRA Analyses 
"*  A basis for why the other PRA analyses adequately  reflect the as-built, as
operated plant.  
"•  A disposition of the impact of the low element grades or serious F&Os on the 
other PRA analyses.  
"*  Identification of and basis for any sensitivity analyses necessary to address 
issues identified in the other PRAs.  
The Integrated Decision-making Panel (IDP) utilizes the PRA quality information,  the 
results of the categorization analyses and other information to recommend a 
categorization  for each SSC.  The process to be used by the IDP for the categorization 
and the justification for adequacy of the PRA information is summarized  in the submittal 
to the NRC.  
2.4.2  Compilation of Risk Insights & Safety Significant Attributes 
The categorization process described in this section  is one acceptable way to undertake 
the categorization of SSCs.  Other methods using a different combination of probabilistic 
and deterministic approaches and criteria can be envisioned.  However, it is expected that 
the guiding principles (Section 2.1)  of this guidance method be maintained.  
The compilation of risk insights and identification of safety significant attributes builds 
upon the plant-specific resources.  An overview of the safety significance process is 
shown in Figure 2.4-1.  
The initial screening is performed  at the system/structure level.  If the system/structure is 
found to have a role in a particular portion of the plant's risk profile, then a component 
level evaluation can be performed.
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The first question in the safety significance process involves the role the system/structure 
plays in the prevention and mitigation of severe accidents3. If the system/structure  is not 
involved in severe accident prevention or mitigation, then the screening process is 
terminated  and the assessment of the safety classification is left to the IDP to determine.  
If all system functions are classified  as low safety significant by the IDP, then every 
component in the system will be classified  as low safety significant.  
If a system or structure is involved in the prevention or mitigation of severe accidents, 
then the first risk contributor evaluated is from the internal events PRA.  The question of 
whether a system or structure is evaluated in the internal events PRA (or any of the 
analyses considered in this guideline) must be answered by considering not only whether 
it is explicitly modeled in the PRA (i.e., in the form of basic event(s)) but also whether it 
is implicitly evaluated in the model through operator actions, super components or 
another aggregated events sometimes used in PRAs.  The term "evaluated" means: 
"* Can it produce a potential initiating event? 
"* Is it credited for mitigation? 
"* Is it necessary for another system or structure evaluated in the PRA to prevent an event 
or mitigate an event? 
Some systems and structures are implicitly modeled in the PRA.  Personnel 
knowledgeable in the scope, level of detail and assumptions of the PRA must make this 
determination.  If the system or structure is determined to be evaluated  in the internal 
events PRA, then the internal event PRA significance process is used to determine 
whether it should be considered safety significant for this element of the plant risk 
profile.  This process is discussed in Section 2.4.2.1.  
If the system/structure is not evaluated in the internal events PRA, then the assessment of 
the safety classification relative to internal events is left to the IDP to determine.  In 
either case, the evaluation is continued with fire risk.  
If the plant has a fire PRA, then the next step of the screening process is to determine 
whether the system or structure is evaluated in the fire PRA.  This can be an even more 
difficult assessment to make than for the internal events PRA because of the important 
(and implicit) role that structures, such as fire barriers play in fire PRAs.  Personnel 
knowledgeable  in the scope, level of  detail and assumptions of the fire PRA must make 
this determination.  If the system or structure is determined to be evaluated in the fire 
PRA, then the fire PRA significance process is used to determine whether it should be 
considered safety significant for this element of the plant risk profile.  This process is 
discussed in Section 2.4.2.2.  
If the plant does not have a fire PRA, then it is likely to have a fire risk evaluation that 
was performed using the EPRI Fire Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE) 
3  severe accident - an accident that usually involves extensive core damage  and fission product 
release into the reactor vessel, containment, or the environment.
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methodology.  Once again, personnel knowledgeable in the scope, level of detail and 
assumptions of the FIVE analysis must make this determination.  If the system or 
structure is determined to be evaluated in the FIVE analysis, then the FIVE significance 
process is used to determine whether it should be considered safety significant for this 
element of the plant risk profile.  This process is discussed in Section 2.4.2.2.  
If the system/structure is not involved in either a fire PRA or FIVE evaluation,  then the 
assessment of the safety classification relative to fire risks is left to the IDP to determine.
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Figure 2.4-1 
OVERALL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE PROCESS
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If the plant has a seismic PRA, then the next step of the screening process is to determine 
whether the system or structure is evaluated in the seismic PRA.  Often structures  are 
explicitly modeled in seismic PRAs.  Personnel knowledgeable  in the scope, level of 
detail and assumptions of the seismic PRA must make the determination.  If the system or 
structure is determined to be evaluated in the seismic PRA, then the seismic PRA 
significance process is used to determine whether it should be considered  safety 
significant for this element of the plant risk profile.  This process is discussed in Section 
2.4.2.3.  
If the plant does not have a seismic PRA, then it is likely to have a seismic margin 
evaluation  that was performed to support the requirements of the IPEEE.  Once again, 
personnel knowledgeable  in the scope, level of detail and assumptions of the seismic 
margins analysis must make this determination.  If the system or structure is determined 
to be evaluated in the seismic margins analysis, then the seismic margins significance 
process  is used to determine whether it should be considered  safety significant for this 
element of the plant risk profile.  This process is discussed in Section 2.4.2.3.  
If the system/structure  is not involved in either a seismic PRA or seismic margins 
evaluation, then the assessment of the safety classification relative to seismic risks is left 
to the IDP to determine.  
If the plant has a PRA, which evaluates other external hazards, then the next step of the 
screening process is to determine whether the system or structure is evaluated in the 
external hazards PRA.  Often structures are explicitly modeled in external hazards PRAs.  
Personnel knowledgeable  in the scope, level of detail and assumptions of the external 
hazards PRA must make the determination.  If the system or structure is determined to be 
evaluated in the external  hazards PRA, then the external hazards PRA significance 
process is used to determine whether it should be considered safety significant for this 
element of the plant risk profile.  This process is discussed in Section 2.4.2.4.  
If the plant does not have an external hazards PRA, then it is likely to have an external 
hazards screening evaluation which was performed to support the requirements  of the 
IPEEE.  Once again, personnel knowledgeable in the scope, level of detail  and 
assumptions of the external hazards analysis must make this determination.  If the system 
or structure is determined to be evaluatkJ  in the external hazards analysis, then the 
external hazards screening significance process is used to determine whether it should be 
considered safety significant for this element of the plant risk profile.  This process is 
discussed in Section 2.4.2.4.  
If the system/structure  is not involved in either a external hazards PRA or external 
hazards screening evaluation,  then the assessment of the safety classification relative to 
external hazards  risks is left to the IDP to determine.  
If the plant has a shutdown PRA, then the next step of the screening process is to 
determine whether the system or structure is evaluated  in the shutdown PRA.  Personnel 
knowledgeable in the scope, level of detail and assumptions of the shutdown PRA must
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make the determination.  If the system or structure is determined to be evaluated in the 
shutdown PRA, then the shutdown PRA significance process is used to determine 
whether it should be considered safety significant for this element of the plant risk 
profile.  This process is discussed in Section 2.4.2.5.  
If the plant does not have a shutdown PRA, then it is likely to have a shutdown safety 
program developed to support implementation of NUMARC 91-06.  Once again, 
personnel knowledgeable  in the scope, level of detail and assumptions of the NUMARC 
91-06 program must make this determination.  If the system or structure is determined  to 
be credited in the NUMARC  91-06, then the shutdown safety significance process is used 
to determine whether it should be considered safety significant for this element of the 
plant risk profile.  This process is discussed in Section 2.4.2.5.  
If the system/structure  is not involved in a shutdown PRA or NUMARC 91-06, then the 
assessment of the safety classification relative to shutdown risks is left to the IDP to 
determine.  
2.4.2.1  Internal Event Assessment 
For systems and structures that are determined  to be evaluated in the internal  events PRA 
for the plant, their significance is evaluated using Figures 2.4-2 and 2.4-3.  
The generalized safety significance process for systems  and components  addressed  in a 
PRA is characterized  in Figure 2.4-2.  This same process is applicable  regardless of the 
scope of the PRA (internal, fire, external, etc.).  The first step in this process involves 
identifying the design basis and severe accident mitigation function(s), which the system 
supports.  Components within the system are then evaluated  to determine whether the 
PRA required that component to perform a safety function evaluated  in the PRA (i.e., 
PRA function).  If the component is not required, then the question of whether it is safety 
related or not is asked.  If it is not safety related, then it is considered a candidate  for 
classification as RISC-4.  The term candidate  simply refers to the fact that it will be 
recommended to the IDP for this portion of the risk profile as low safety significant and 
non-safety related.  If the component is safety related, but wasn't required to support a 
PRA function, then before it is preliminarily classified  as a candidate RISC-3  component, 
an investigation is undertaken to determine why it was deemed safety related, 'Out was not 
required for the PRA.  
The importance evaluation can be performed  at the system level for the purposes of 
screening.  The remainder of this section discusses the process at the component level, 
which is the lowest level of detail expected  to be performed.  
Components, which support a PRA function, are evaluated using the risk importance 
process shown in Figure 2.4-3.  Some PRA tools allow for the evaluation of importance 
measures, which include the role in initiating events.  For those cases, the importance 
measures provide sufficient scope to perform the initial screening.  In cases where the 
importance measures do not include initiating event importance, a qualitative process is
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used to address the initiating event role of the SSC.  The mitigation importance of the 
SSC is assessed using the available importance measures.  This process questions 
whether the SSC can directly cause a complicated initiating event which has a Fussell
Vesely importance greater than the criteria (0.005),  then it is considered a candidate 
safety significant and the attributes which could influence that role as an initiating event 
are to be identified.  A complicated initiating event is considered an event that trips the 
plant and causes  an impact on a key safety function.  Examples of complicated  initiating 
events include loss of all Feedwater (PWR/BWR), loss of condenser (BWRs), etc.  
The assessment of importance for an SSC involves the identification of PRA basic events 
which represent the SSC.  This can include events which explicitly model the 
performance of an SSC (e.g., pump X fails to start), events which implicitly model an 
SSC (e.g., some human actions, initiating events, etc.) or a combination of both types of 
events.  Personnel familiar with the PRA will have to identify the events in the PRA 
which can be used to represent each SSC.  In general, PRAs are not as capable of easily 
assessing the importance of passive components  such as pipes and tanks.  However, in 
some cases, focused calculations or sensitivity studies can be used.  
The risk importance process utilizes two standard PRA importance measures, risk 
achievement worth (RAW) and Fussell-Vesely (F-V), as screening tools to identify 
candidate high safety significant SSCs.  Risk reduction worth (RRW) is also an 
acceptable measure in place of Fussell-Vesely.  The Fussell-Vesely criteria can be readily 
converted to RRW criteria.  The Fussell-Vesely importance of a component is considered 
to be the sum of the F-V importances  for the relevant failure modes of the component, 
including common cause failure.  If a component  does not have a common cause event to 
be included in the computation of importances, then an assessment should be made as to 
whether a common cause event should be added to the model.  The RAW importance of a 
component is considered the maximum of the RAW values  computed for basic events 
involving the component.  In the case of RAW, the common cause event is not 
considered in the assessment of component risk significance  4. The RAW for common 
cause events is an unrealistic parameter since it reflects the relative increase in 
CDF/LERF  that would exist if a common cause failure condition existed for an entire 
year.  
For example, a motor operated valve may have a number of basic events associated with 
it, each of which has a sepzrrite Fussell-Vesely importance.  Likewise, the risk 
4 The potential implication  of common cause failures introduced by changes in treatment could be 
evaluated by computing the risk increase assuming all random failures were assumed to be common 
cause (set the common cause event probability equal to the failure probability of a single component).  
However, as long as the conditional probability of the common cause failure is greater than 0.005, 
the F-V importance provides  a bounding assessment.  That is,  a relative risk increase of a factor of 2 
can only exist for an event with a F-V of less than 0.005 if the probability of the event is increased by 
more than a factor of 200 (1/0.005).  Since current common cause methods generally yield conditional 
probabilities  of between 0.1  and 0.01, the use of such a sensitivity is not deemed necessary.  
However, the conditional probabilities used in the PRA should be reviewed.  In cases where values 
less than 0.005 are used, if the combination of F-V and conditional probability would yield a risk 
increase  of more than 2 would, the SSC should be identified as potentially safety significant.
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achievement worth of a component is the maximum value determined  from the relevant 
failure modes (basic events): 
EXAMPLE IMPORTANCE SUMMARY 
COMPONENT  FAILURE MODE  F-V  RAW 
Valve 'A' Fails to Open  0.002  1.7 
Valve 'A' Fails to Remain Closed  0.00002  1.1 
Valve 'A' In Maintenance  0.0035  1.7 
Common Cause Failure of Valves 'A' & 'B'  0.004  n/a 
Component Importance  0.00952  1.7 
Criteria  > 0.005  >2 
Candidate Risk Significant?  Yes 
In cases where the internal events core damage frequency is dominated by flooding, it is 
appropriate  to break the evaluation of importance measures  into two steps.  The first step 
uses importance measures computed using the entire internal event PRA.  The second 
step uses importance measures computed without the dominant contributor included.  
This prevents "masking" of importance by the dominant contributor.  
If the screening criteria are met for either importance measure, it is considered a 
candidate safety significant component and the safety significant attributes are to be 
identified.  If the risk importance measure criteria are not met, then it is not automatically 
low safety significant.  It must be evaluated  as part of several sensitivity studies, 
determined to be low safety significant for all risk contributors and must be reviewed by 
the IDP.  If the importance measures computed by the PRA tool do not indicate that a 
component meets the Fussell-Vesely or RAW criteria, then sensitivity studies are used to 
determine whether other conditions might lead to the component becoming safety 
significant.  The recommended sensitivity studies for internal events PRA are identified 
in Table 2.4- 1: 
Table 2.4-1 
Sensitivity Studies For Internal Events PRA
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Sensitivity Study 
"*  Increase all human error basic events to their 95t" 
percentile value 
"*  Decrease all human error basic events to their 5th 
percentile value 
"*  Increase all component common cause events to 
their 95th percentile value 
"*  Decrease all component common cause events to 
their 5th percentile value 
"*  Increase all component random failure events to 
their 9 5 th percentile value 
"*  Decrease all component random failure events to 
their 5th percentile valueDRAFT  NEI 00-04 
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*  Set all maintenance unavailability terms to 0.0 
The sensitivity studies on human error rates, common cause failures and maintenance 
unavailabilities  are performed to assure that assumptions of the PRA are not masking the 
importance of an SSC.  The sensitivity addressing the variation of random failure 
probabilities is performed  to assure that anticipated variations in individual  SSC 
performance would be unlikely to change the classification.  
If the sensitivity studies identify that the component could be safety significant, then the 
safety significant attributes which yielded that conclusion should be identified.  
If, following the sensitivity studies, the component is still found to be low safety 
significant and it is safety related, it is a candidate for RISC-3.  In this case the analyst is 
expected to define why that component is of low risk significance (e.g.,  doesn't perform 
an important function, excess redundancy, low frequency of challenge, etc.).  
This risk importance process is performed  for both CDF and LERF.  In calculating the 
FV risk importance measure, it is recommended  that a CDF (or LERF) cutset truncation 
level of at least five orders of magnitude below the baseline CDF (or LERF) value be 
used.  For example, if the internal events, full power CDF baseline value is  1  E-5 /yr, a 
truncation level of at least 1  E-10 /yr is recommended.  When the RAW risk importance 
measure is calculated by a full re-solution of the plant PRA model, then the truncation 
level does not significantly affect the RAW calculations.  In this case, a default truncation 
value of 1  E-9 /yr seems reasonable.  However, if a pre-solved set of cutsets is used to 
calculate RAWs, the truncation level should be set to a sufficiently low value so that all 
SSCs with RAW>2 are identified (e.g.,  cutoff of IE-10 /yr or lower).  The truncation of 
the PRA model should be checked  to ensure that the CDF & LERF values have 
converged and that the importance measures are stabilized.  
Defense-in-Depth Assessment 
In cases where the component is safety related and found to be of low safety significance, 
it is appropriate to confirm that defense in depth is preserved.  This discussion should 
include consideration of the events mitigated, the functions performed, the other systems 
whjch  support those functions and the complement of other plant capabilities which can 
be relied upon to prevent core damage and large, early release.  This assessment should 
consider both the level of defense  in depth and to the frequency  of the events being 
mitigated.  The table below is an example of such an assessment:
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Frequency  Design Basis Event 
>1 per 1-10 yr  Reactor Trip 
Loss of Condenser 
1 per  10-102 yr  Loss of Offsite Power 
Total loss of Main FW 
Stuck open SRV (BWR) 
MSLB (outside cntmt) 
Loss of 1 SR AC Bus 
Loss of Instr/Cntrl Air 
I per 102-103yr  SGTR 
Stuck Open PORV/SV 
RCP Seal LOCA 
MFLB 
MSLB Inside 
Loss of I SR DC bus 
<1 per  103-10
4yr  LOCAs 
Other Design Basis 
Accidents
>3 diverse trains 
OR 
2 redundant 
systems
1 train +  1 
system with 
redundancy
2 diverse 
trains
1 redundant 
automatic 
system
For example, if a PWR found that SSCs in the condensate system could be classified as 
low safety significant, this table could be used to qualitatively evaluate the safety 
significance.  Since condensate is primarily relied upon as a secondary heat removal 
source following a reactor trip, the plant could confirm the low safety significance if 
three diverse trains or two redundant systems of heat removal are available.  Many plants 
have three diverse trains of alternate feedwater makeup (e.g., turbine driven AFW, motor 
driven AFW and startup feedwater or diesel driven AFW) and many PWRs can utilize 
primary  system bleed and feed as a means of heat removal.  In these cases, the 
classification of condensate components as a low safety significant could be confirmed.  
If less defense in depth is available, that information should be provided to the IDP  for 
their consideration  in the final classification.  
Defense in depth should also be assessed for SSCs which play a role in preventing large, 
early releases.  Level 2 PRAs have identified the several containment challenges which 
are important to LERF.  These include containment bypass such as ISLOCA (BWR & 
PWR) and SGTR (PWR), containment isolation failures (BWR & PWR),  and early 
hydrogen bums (ice condensers & Mark III),
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Before making the final decision on whether a SSC is categorized  as low safety 
significance, the IDP should consider the following  criteria: 
Containment Bypass 
"*  Can the SSC  initiate or isolate an ISLOCA event.  
"*  Can the SSC  isolate a faulted steam generator following a steam generator tube 
rupture event.  
Containment Isolation 
"*  Does the SSC  support containment isolation for containment penetrations which 
are: 
*  >2" in diameter, 
*  part of a system which is not considered  closed as defined  in GDC 57, 
*  not normally closed or locked closed, and 
*  not a part of a normally liquid filled system.  
Early Hydrogen Bums 
"*  Does the SSC  support operation of hydrogen igniters in ice condenser and Mark 
III containments.  
In cases where SSCs are identified as safety significant, the safety significant attributes 
should be defined by the analyst familiar with the PRA.  This involves identifying the 
performance aspects and failure modes of the SSC, which contribute to it being safety 
significant.  These attributes are to be provided to the IDP as input to the definition  of 
treatment for RISC-I  and RISC-2 SSCs.  
The output of the risk importance  evaluation feeds back into the safety significance 
process of Figure 2.4-2.  If the risk importance process does not indicate that the 
component is safety significant, then the question of safety related is asked.  In the event 
it is a safety related component, then the basis for that designation is questioned and the 
component is designated  as candidate RISC-3.  If the component is not safety related, 
then it is a candidate for RISC-4.
30DRAFT  NEI 00-04 
Revision A2 
Figure 2.4-2 
GENERALIZED  SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE  PROCESS  FOR 
SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS ADDRESSED  IN PRA
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Figure 2.4-3 
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2.4.2.2 Fire Assessment 
The fire safety significance process takes one of two forms.  For plants with a fire PRA, 
the process is similar to that described for internal events PRA.  This process is shown on 
Figures 2.4-2  and 2.4-4 and is discussed below.  Plants, which relied upon a FIVE 
analysis to assess fire risks for the IPEEE, would use a modified process shown in Figure 
2.4-5.  
The generalized  safety significance process for plants with a fire PRA is the same as the 
process for internal events.  The risk importance process is slightly modified to consider 
the fact that most fire PRAs do not have the ability to aggregate the mitigation 
importance of a component with the fire initiation contribution.  For that reason, 
components are evaluated using standard importance measures  for their mitigation 
capability and separately for the potential to initiate a fire.  Aside from that small change, 
the process is the same as the internal event PRA process.  
However, if the fire PRA CDF is a small fraction of the internal  events CDF (i.e., <1%), 
then safety significance of SSCs considered in the fire PRA can be considered  low safety 
significant from a fire perspective.  
The recommended sensitivity studies for fire PRA are identified in Table 2.4-2: 
Table 2.4-2 
Sensitivity Studies For Fire PRA 
Sensitivity Study 
"*  Increase all human error basic events to their 95th 
percentile value 
"*  Decrease all human error basic events to their 5th 
percentile value 
"*  Increase all component common cause events to 
their 95th percentile value 
"*  Decrease all component common cause events to 
their 5th percentile value 
"*  Increase all component random failure events to 
their 95th percentile value 
"*  Decrease all component random failure events to 
their 5th percentile value 
"*  Set all maintenance unavailability terms to 0.0 
"*  All manual suppression =1.0 
If the sensitivity studies identify that the component could be safety significant, then the 
safety significant attributes which yielded that conclusion should be identified.  If, 
following the sensitivity studies, the component is still found to be low safety significant 
and it is safety related, it could be a candidate for RISC-3.  In this case the analyst is 
expected  to define why that component is of low risk significance (e.g., doesn't perform 
an important  function, excess redundancy, low frequency of challenge,  etc.).
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This risk importance process is performed for both CDF and LERF.  Where LERF can 
not be quantitatively linked into the fire model, the insights from the internal events 
LERF model should be qualitatively coupled with the assessment of fire impacts on 
containment isolation to develop recommendations to the IDP on LERF contributors.  
The output of the fire risk importance evaluation  feeds back into the safety significance 
process of Figure 2.4-2.  If the risk importance process does not indicate that the 
component is safety significant, then the question of safety related is asked.  In the event 
it is a safety related component, then the basis for that designation is questioned and the 
component is designated as a candidate for RISC-3.  If the component is not safety 
related, then it is a candidate for RISC-4.  
Figure 2.4-4 
RISK  IMPORTANCE ASSESSMENT  PROCESS FOR COMPONENTS 
ADDRESSED  IN FIRE PRAs 
ompute Component 
portance Measures 
or>N  Perform  or  No 
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(Table 2.4-2) 
Yes 
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Importance  Related?  Safety Significant 
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Safety Signifi  ant  Wh  ponent is Not 
Safety Significant 
Ide s  afety Significant 
Candte  wi 
in  2nur  2.4-5.  
[Attrbutes of Component  Safety Significant 
The FIVE methodology is a screening approach to evaluating  fire hazards.  It does not 
generate numbers, which are true core damage values; rather, it simply assists in 
identifying potential  fire susceptibilities  and vulnerabilities.  For this reason, it is 
somewhat limited in being  able to support the identification of low safety significant 
components.  The safety significance  process for plants with FIVE evaluations  is shown 
in Figure 2.4-5.
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In this process,  after identifying the design basis and severe accident functions of the 
component, the results of the FIVE analysis are reviewed to determine if any SSCs can be 
identified as high or low safety significant.  If a component participates, either by 
initiating or in the mitigation of an unscreened  fire scenario, it is considered safety 
significant.  This is somewhat conservative since the FIVE process does not generate core 
damage frequency values.  However, the option always  exists for the licensee to extend 
their FIVE analysis to a fire PRA to remove any conservatisms.  
If the component does not participate in an unscreened  scenario, then its participation in 
screened scenarios is questioned.  If it can be shown that the component either did not 
participate in any screened scenarios or, even if credit for the component was removed, 
the screened scenario would not become unscreened,  then it is considered candidate low 
safety significant.
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Figure 2.4-5 
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2.4.2.3 Seismic Assessment 
The seismic safety significance process also takes one of two forms.  For plants with a 
seismic PRA, the process is similar to that described for internal events PRA.  This 
process is shown on Figures 2.4-2 and 2.4-6 and discussed below.  For plants, which 
relied upon a seismic margins analysis to assess seismic risks for the IPEEE, they would 
use a modified process shown in Figure 2.4-7.  
The generalized safety significance process for plants with a seismic PRA is the same as 
the process for internal events.  The risk importance  process is slightly modified to 
consider the fact plant components can not initiate seismic events.  Aside from that small 
change, the process is the same as the internal  event PRA process.  
However, if the seismic PRA CDF is a small  fraction of the internal events CDF (i.e., 
<1%), then safety significance of SSCs considered  in the seismic PRA can be considered 
low safety significant from a seismic perspective.  
The recommended sensitivity studies for seismic PRA are identified in Table 2.4-3: 
Table 2.4-3 
Sensitivity Studies For Seismic PRA 
*  Sensitivity Study 
*  Increase all human error basic events to their 95t 
percentile value 
*  Decrease all human error basic events to their 5th 
percentile value 
*  Increase all component common cause events to 
their 95th percentile value 
*  Decrease all component common cause events to 
their 5th percentile value 
*  Increase all component random failure events to 
their 95h percentile value 
*  Decrease all component random failure events to 
their 5th percentile value 
*  Set all maintenance unavailability terms to 0.0 
*  Use correlated fragilities for all SSCs in an area 
If the sensitivity studies identify that the component could be safety significant, then the 
safety significant attributes which yielded that conclusion should be identified.  If, 
following the sensitivity studies, the component is still found to be low safety significant 
and it is safety related, it could be a candidate for RISC-3.  In this case the analyst is 
expected to define why that component is of low risk significance (e.g., doesn't perform 
an important  function, excess redundancy, low frequency of challenge,  etc.).
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This risk importance process is performed for both CDF and LERF.  Where LERF can 
not be quantitatively linked into the seismic model, the insights from the internal events 
LERF model should be qualitatively coupled with the assessment of seismic impacts on 
containment to develop recommendations to the IDP on LERF contributors.  
The output of the seismic risk importance  evaluation feeds back into the safety 
significance process of Figure 2.4-2.  If the risk importance process does not indicate that 
the component is safety significant, then the question of safety related is asked.  In the 
event it is a safety related component, then the basis for that designation is questioned 
and the component is designated as a candidate for RISC-3.  If the component is not 
safety related, then it is a candidate for RISC-4.  
Figure 2.4-6 
RISK  IMPORTANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS FOR COMPONENTS 
ADDRESSED  IN SEISMIC  PRAs
The seismic margins methodology is a screening approach to evaluating seismic hazards.  
It does not generate core damage values; rather, it simply assists in identifying potential 
seismic susceptibilities and vulnerabilities.  For this reason, it is somewhat limited in 
being able to support the identification of low safety significant components.  The safety 
significance  process for plants with seismic margins evaluations is shown in Figure 2.4-7.
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In this process, after identifying the design basis and severe accident functions of the 
component, the seismic margins analysis is reviewed to determine if the component is 
credited as part of the safe shutdown paths evaluated.  If a component is credited, it is 
considered safety significant.  This is conservative  since the seismic margin process does 
not generate core damage frequency values.  However, the option always exists for the 
licensee to perform a seismic PRA to remove any conservatisms.  
If the component does not participate in the safe shutdown path, then it is considered a 
candidate low safety significant with respect to seismic risk.  
If the risk importance process does not indicate that the component is safety significant, 
then the question of safety related is asked.  In the event it is a safety related component, 
then the basis for that designation is questioned and the component is designated as a 
candidate for RISC-3.  If the component is not safety related, then it is a candidate for 
RISC-4.
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Other External Hazard Assessment
The significance process for other external hazards (i.e.,  excluding fire and seismic) also 
takes one of two forms.  For plants with an external hazards PRA, the process is similar 
to that described  for internal events PRA.  This process is shown on Figures 2.4-2  and 
2.4-8  and discussed below.  Plants, which relied upon an external  hazard screening to
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Figure 2.4-7 
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE  PROCESS  FOR 
SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS ADDRESSED  IN SEISMIC  MARGINS
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assess external hazards for the IPEEE, would use a modified process shown in Figure 
2.4-9.  
The generalized safety significance process for plants with an external hazard PRA is the 
same as the process for internal events.  As for seismic risk, the risk importance process 
is slightly modified to consider the fact plant components  can not initiate external events 
such a floods, tornadoes, and high winds.  Aside from that small change, the process is 
the same as the internal event PRA process.  
However, if the external hazards PRA CDF is a small fraction of the internal events CDF 
(i.e.,  <1%), then safety significance of SSCs considered  in the external hazards PRA can 
be considered low safety significant from an external hazards perspective.  
The recommended sensitivity studies for other external hazard PRAs are identified in 
Table 2.4-4: 
Table 2.4-4 
Sensitivity Studies For Other External Hazard PRA 
Sensitivity Study 
"  Increase  all human error basic events to their 95th 
percentile value 
"  Decrease  all human error basic events to their 5th 
percentile  value 
"  Increase  all component common cause events to 
their 95th percentile value 
"  Decrease  all component common cause events to 
their 5th percentile value 
"  Increase all component random failure events to 
their 95"h percentile value 
"  Decrease  all component random failure events to 
their 5th percentile value 
"  Set all maintenance unavailability terms to 0.0 
If the sensitivity studies identify that the component could be safety significant, then the 
safety significant attributes which yielded that conclusion should be identified.  If, 
following the sensitivity studies, the component is still found to be low safety significant 
and it is safety related, it could be a candidate for RISC-3.  In this case the analyst is 
expected to define why that component is of low risk significance (e.g., doesn't perform 
an important function, excess redundancy, low frequency of challenge,  etc.).  
This risk importance process is performed for both CDF and LERF.  Where LERF can 
not be quantitatively linked into the external hazard model, the insights from the internal 
events LERF model should be qualitatively coupled with the assessment of external 
hazard impacts on containment to develop a recommendations to the IDP on LERF 
contributors.
41DRAFT  NEI 00-04 
Revision A2 
The output of the external hazard risk importance  evaluation feeds back into the safety 
significance process of Figure 2.4-2.  If the risk importance process does not indicate that 
the component is safety significant, then the question of safety related is asked.  In the 
event it is a safety related component, then the basis for that designation is questioned 
and the component is designated  as a candidate for RISC-3.  If the component is not 
safety related, then it is a candidate for RISC-4.  
Figure 2.4-8 
RISK  IMPORTANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESS  FOR COMPONENTS 
ADDRESSED  IN  EXTERNAL  EVENT  PRAs
The external hazard screening does not generate core damage values; rather it simply 
assists in identifying that the plant has no significant external hazard susceptibilities and 
vulnerabilities.  For this reason, it is somewhat limited in being able to support the 
identification of low safety significant components.  The safety significance process for 
plants with external hazard screening evaluations is shown in Figure 2.4-9.  
In this process, after identifying the design basis and severe  accident functions of  the 
component, the external hazard analysis is reviewed to determine if the component is 
credited as part of the safety shutdown paths evaluated.  If a component is credited, it is 
considered safety significant.  This is conservative since the external hazard screening 
process does not generate core damage frequency values.  However, the option always 
exists for the licensee to perform an external hazard PRA to remove any conservatisms.
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If the component does not participate in the safe shutdown path, then it is considered a 
candidate low safety significant with respect to external hazards.  
Figure 2.4-9 
SAFETY  SIGNIFICANCE  PROCESS  FOR 
SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS  ADDRESSED 
IN  EXTERNAL  EVENT SCREENING 
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2.4.2.5 Shutdown Assessment 
The shutdown safety significance process also takes one of two forms.  For plants with a 
shutdown PRA that is comparable to an at-power PRA (i.e.,  generates annual  average 
CDF/LERF), the process is similar to that described for internal events PRA.  This 
process is shown on Figures 2.4-2 and 2.4-10.  Plants, which do not have a shutdown 
PRA, would use a modified process shown in Figure 2.4-11  based on their NUMARC  91
06 program.  Due to the similarities between shutdown and at-power PRAs, the 
generalized  safety significance process for plants with a shutdown PRA is the same as the 
process for internal events.  
However, if the shutdown PRA CDF is a small fraction of the internal events CDF (i.e., 
<1%), then safety significance of SSCs considered in the shutdown PRA can be 
considered low safety significant from a shutdown perspective.  
The same sensitivity studies identified in Table 2.4-4 should be used in the evaluation of 
shutdown risk significance.
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Figure 2.4-10 
RISK IMPORTANCE  ASSESSMENT  PROCESS 
FOR COMPONENTS  ADDRESSED IN 
LOW POWER/SHUTDOWN  PRAs 
(Same as Internal Event PRA)
Meeting the guidelines for shutdown safety identified in NUMARC 91-06 is not 
equivalent to a shutdown PRA and does not generate quantitative information 
comparable to core damage values.  Rather it simply attempts to assure that the plant has
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an appropriate complement of systems available at all times.  The safety 
significance process for plants without a shutdown PRA is shown in Figure 2.4-11.  
In this process a component can be identified as safety significant  for shutdown 
conditions for one of two reasons: 
1.  It  could initiate a shutdown event (e.g., loss of shutdown cooling, 
drain down, etc.), 
2.  It satisfies both of the following conditions: 
- It participates in a safety function whose failure can result in 
increasing CDF or LERF, and 
- The minimum requirements5  cannot be met for the safety function 
without the system, structure,  or component.  
If the component does not participate in either of these manners, then it is 
considered a candidate as low safety significance with respect to shutdown safety.  
In this assessment, a primary shutdown  safety system refers to a system, which has 
the following attributes: 
"*  It has a reasonable pedigree 
"*  It has substantial margin to fulfill the safety function 
"*  It  does not require extensive manual manipulation to fulfill its safety 
function 
If the risk importance process does not indicate that the component  is safety 
significant, then the question of safety related is asked.  In the event it is a safety 
related component, then the basis for that designation is questioned and the 
component is designated as a candidate for RISC-3.  If the component is not safety 
related, then it is a candidate for RISC-4.  
5 Each outage may be uniquely planned.  However, the configuration control  in place will maintain adequate safety 
and defense-in-depth.  The Outage Risk Management Guidelines categorize the level of safety and specify the 
minimum acceptable number of systems  for each safety function (e.g.,  sometimes referred  to as the ORANGE 
condition).
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SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE  PROCESS  FOR 
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2.4.2.6 Integral Assessment
In order to provide the IDP with an overall assessment of the risk significance  of SSCs, 
an integrated computation is performed using the available importance measures.  This
47DRAFT  NEI 00-04 
Revision A2 
integrated importance measure essentially weights the importance from each risk 
contributor (e.g.,  internal events, fire, seismic PRAs) by the fraction of the total core 
damage frequency contributed by that contributor.  The following formulas define how 
such measures  are to be computed  for CDF.  The same format can be used for LERF, if 
available.  
Integrated Fussell-Vesely Importance 
I  (FVi,j * CDFJ) 
IFVi =  CD 
E  Dj 
Where, 
IFVi =  Integrated Fussell-Vesely Importance of Component i over all CDF Contributors 
FVij  = Fussell-Vesely Importance of Component i for CDF Contributor j 
CDFj = CDF of Contributor j 
Integrated Risk Achievement Worth Importance 
E  (RA Wi j - 1)  * CDFj 
IRAW.±=  I'  j  ZCD 
J 
Where, 
IRAW, = Integrated Risk Achievement Worth of Component i over all CDF Contributors 
RAWij  = Risk Achievement Worth of Component i for CDF Contributor j 
CDFi = CDF of Contributor j 
Integrated Risk Reduction Worth Importance 
I  (R-R Wiýj  - 1)  * CDF, 
IRR W i  =  I+  j  CD 
Z CDFj 
Where, 
IRRWi = Integrated Risk Reduction  Worth of Component i over all CDF Contributors 
RRWij  = Risk Reduction Worth of Component i for CDF Contributor j 
CDFj = CDF of Contributorj 
Once calculated, an assessment should be made of these integrated values against the 
screening  criteria of Fussell-Vesely >0.005 and RAW > 2.  In no case will the integrated 
importance become higher than the maximum of the individual measures.  However, it is 
possible that the integral value could be significantly less than the highest contributor, if 
that contributor is small relative to the total CDF/LERF.
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2.4.2.7 Presentation of Risk Information 
The results of the compilation of risk information and safety significant attributes should 
be documented for the IDP's use.  Figure 2.4-12 provides and example, conceptual layout 
of the information that is generated by this process and could be useful for the IDP.  This 
format is for the purposes of identifying what could be communicated and is not required.  
The assessment of overall safety significance  from the PRA involves consideration of the 
results of the categorization  for each individual hazard and the integral assessment.  The 
following guidelines  are provided to assist in the communication of the categorization 
results to the IDP: 
"*  If the SSC was found to be safety significant based on the internal  events PRA 
without consideration of sensitivity studies, then it should be recommended to the 
IDP  as safety significant.  
"*  If the SSC was found to be of low safety significant based on the internal events 
PRA, but was found to be potentially safety significant based on the fire, seismic, 
other external hazards,  or shutdown PRA assessments, then the integral assessment 
should be relied upon.  
"*  If the SSC was found to be safety significant based on sensitivity studies, this should 
be communicated to the IDP, along with the base and integral significance for each 
hazard.
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Figure 2.4-12 
EXAMPLE  RISK-INFORMED  SSC ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
SSC(s) EVALUATED: 
SAFETY RELATED:  YES {  No { 
DESIGN BASIS FUNCTION(S)  SUPPORTED: 
PRA FUNCTIONS  SUPPORTED:
Potentially  Potentially 
Risk  Non-Risk  Not 
Significant  Significant  Assessed  Comments 
Internal  Events  CDF 
LERF 
Fire  CDF 
LERF 
Seismic  CDF 
LERF 
External Hazards  CDF 
LERF 
Low Power/ Shutdown  CDF 
LERF 
Integral Assessment  CDF 
LERF
SENSITIVITY STUDY RESULTS: 
DEFENSE IN DEPTH/COMMON  CAUSE ASSESSMENT: 
BASIS FOR RECOMMENDED  SSC CLASSIFICATION: 
SAFETY SIGNIFICANT ATRIBUTES:
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2.4.3  Integrated Decision-Making Panel Review & Classification 
The Integrated Decision-making Panel (IDP) uses the information and insights compiled 
in the initial categorization process and combines that with other information from design 
bases, defense in depth, and safety margins to finalize the categorization of SSCs.  
2.4.3.1 Panel Makeup & Training 
The IDP is composed  of knowledgeable plant personnel whose expertise represents the 
important process and functional elements of the plant organization, such as operations, 
design and engineering (systems, electrical,  I&C including information technology, 
nuclear), industry operating experience, and maintenance.  The panel can call upon 
additional plant personnel or external consultants, as necessary, to assist in the resolution 
of issues.  
The precise makeup of the panel is up to the licensee.  Personnel availability to attend the 
majority, if not all meetings, is an important element in the selection of IDP permanent 
members. In general, there should be at least five experts designated as members of the 
IDP with joint expertise in the following fields: 
"* Plant Operations (SRO  qualified), 
"* Design Engineering (including safety analyses), 
"* Systems Engineering, 
"* Licensing, 
"* Probabilistic Risk Assessment.  
Members may be experts in more than one field; however, excessive reliance on any one 
member's judgement should be avoided.  
The licensee  should establish and document specific requirements  for ensuing adequate 
expertise levels of IDP members, and ensure that expertise levels are maintained.  Two 
key areas of expertise to be emphasized  are experience  at the specific plant being 
evaluated and experience with the plant specific PRA analyses relied upon in the 
categorization process.  
The IDP should be aware of the limitations of the plant specific PRA and, where 
necessary should receive training on the plant specific PRA, its assumptions and 
limitations.  
The IDP should be trained in the specific technical aspects and requirements related to 
the categorization process.  Training should address,  at a minimum, 
"* The purpose of the categorization, 
"* The risk-informed defense-in-depth  philosophy and criteria to maintain this 
philosophy, 
"* PRA fundamentals,
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"* Details of the relied upon plant-specific  PRA analyses including the modeling scope 
and assumptions, 
"* The role of risk importance measures including the use of sensitivity studies, and 
"* The assessment of SSC failure modes and effects.  
Each of these topics  should be covered to the extent necessary to provide the IDP with a 
level of knowledge sufficient to evaluate and approve SSC categorization using both 
probabilistic and deterministic information.  
IDP decision criteria for categorizing SSCs as safety significant or low safety significant 
will be documented.  A consensus process should be used for decision-making.  Differing 
opinions shall be documented and resolved.  
The IDP should perform their activities in accordance with a procedure for determining 
the safety-significance  of a SSC, and for the review of safety-significant  functions and 
attributes to ensure consistency in the decision making process.  The integrated decision 
process should, where possible, apply objective decision criteria and minimize 
subjectivity.  The decisions of the IDP, including the basis, should be documented and 
retained  as quality records for the life of the facility.  
The IDP should be described in a formal plant procedure that includes: 
"* The designated chairman,  panel members, and panel alternates; 
"* Required training and qualifications  for the chairman, members and alternates; 
"* Requirements  for a quorum, attendance records, agendas, and meeting minutes; 
"* The decision-making process; 
"* Documentation  and resolution of differing opinions;  and 
"* Implementation of feedback/corrective actions.  
2.4.3.2 IDP Process 
2.4.3.2 IDP Process 
The preliminary classification information generated as part of the categorization 
process is provided to the IDP for review and final classification.  The overall 
classification process to be used by IDP is shown in Figure 2.4-13.  
As part of the initial categorization effort, SSCs which have similar functions and 
similar roles in the plant PRA analyses are identified and preliminarily categorized 
as RISC-1,  -2, -3,  -4.  The IDP could review this preliminary categorization either by 
individual  SSC or by groups of SSCs.  The initial steps of the IDP involve review of 
the primary technical bases for the initial categorization:  the SSC function(s) and 
the basis for the categorization.  The purpose of this review is for the IDP to 
determine, based on its composite knowledge  of the plant, whether the SSC has
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been appropriately reflected in the categorization.  The appropriateness  of the 
manner in which the SSC has been reflected should be judged based on the scope of 
functions considered and the manner in which the PRA analyses incorporate those 
functions.  If the IDP determines that the SSC has not been appropriately reflected, 
then it is re-evaluated  based on the insights from the IDP.  
Review of Safety Significant SSCs (RISC-1  & -2) 
For those SSCs determined to be appropriately reflected in the categorization, the 
IDP will evaluate the key aspects of the recommended  categorization. For RISC-1 
and RISC-2  SSCs, if the IDP has determined that the SSC was appropriately 
reflected and it was categorized  as RISC-1 or RISC-2, then the IDP can not move 
that SSC to a less safety significant category.  For RISC-1  SSCs, the IDP reviews 
the SSC attributes identified in the categorization process including both the design 
basis attributes and any additional attributes which were identified as important to 
the core damage prevention and mitigation functions of the  SSC outside the design 
basis.  For RISC-2 components, the IDP review will focus on attributes which were 
identified as important to the core damage prevention and mitigation functions of 
the SSC since these SSCs have no safety design basis.  
Review of RISC-3 SSCs 
The SSCs initially categorized  as RISC-3 are safety-related SSCs which were found 
in the categorization  process to be of low safety significance.  The IDP's role for 
these SSCs is to perform a complete risk-informed assessment of the SSC 
categorization including consideration  of the risk information, defense in depth and 
safety margins.  
Review of Risk Information 
For SSCs that have not been identified as safety significant by the safety 
significance process in Section 2.4.2, the IDP should review the results to determine 
whether these SSCs are not implicitly depended upon in the PRA.  The IDP 
determines if: 
"  Failure of the SSC will significantly increase the frequency of an initiating 
event, including those initiating events originally screened out of the PRA based 
on anticipated low frequency of occurrence.  
"  Failure of the SSC will fail a safety function, including SSCs that are assumed to 
be inherently reliable in the PRA (e.g., piping and tanks) and those that may not 
be explicitly modeled (e.g., room cooling systems, and instrumentation and 
control systems).
53DRAFT  NEI 00-04 
Revision A2 
"  The SSC is necessary for safety significant operator actions credited in the PRA, 
including instrumentation and other equipment called for in procedures.  
"  Failure of the SSC will result in failure of safety significant  SSCs in a manner 
which poses  a risk impact (e.g., through spatial interactions).  
If any of the above conditions are true, the IDP should use an evaluation to 
determine the impact of relaxing requirements on SSC reliability and performance.  
Review Defense in Depth Implications 
When categorizing SSCs as low safety significant, the IDP should consider whether 
the defense-in-depth philosophy is maintained.  Defense-in-depth  is considered 
adequate  if the overall redundancy and diversity among the plant's systems and 
barriers is sufficient to assure that no significant increase in risk will occur by the 
change in special treatment, and that: 
"*  Reasonable balance is preserved among prevention of core damage, prevention of 
containment failure or bypass, and mitigation of consequences of an offsite 
release; 
"*  System redundancy, independence,  and diversity is preserved commensurate 
with the expected frequency of challenges, consequences of failure of the system, 
and associated uncertainties in determining these parameters; 
"*  There is no over-reliance on programmatic activities and operator actions to 
compensate for weaknesses in the plant design; and 
"*  Potential for common cause failures is taken into account.  
If any of the above conditions are true, the IDP should perform a qualitative 
evaluation to determine the impact of relaxing requirements on SSC reliability and 
performance.  Low safety significance can still be assigned, if one or more of the 
following are true: 
"*  Relaxing the requirements will have minimal impact on the failure rate 
increase.  
"*  Historical data show that these failure modes are unlikely to occur.  
"*  Such failure modes can be detected in a timely fashion.  
SSCs identified as low safety significant in the initial categorization process, but 
having potential safety significance if common cause failure is assumed, should be 
reviewed by the IDP to determine appropriate strategies for reducing the potential 
for common cause failures and strategies for detection of failures.  This could 
include recommending staggered testing, inspection and/or calibration of 
equipment.
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Review Safety Margin Implications 
When categorizing SSCs as low safety significant, the IDP shall demonstrate  that 
there is a sufficient safety margin to account for uncertainty in the engineering 
analysis and in the supporting data.  Safety margin shall be incorporated when 
determining performance characteristics and parameters  (e.g., component, system, 
and plant capability) or when defining mission success criteria (e.g., the number of 
system trains required to mitigate an initiating event or the ability of an SSC to 
perform  in a certain environment).  The amount of margin should depend on the 
uncertainty associated with the performance parameters in question, the 
availability of alternatives to compensate for adverse performance, and the 
consequences  of failure to meet the performance goals.  Demonstration of available 
safety margins shall be accomplished by use of data from plant operations or 
research studies, or by use of analyses using established engineering codes and 
standards or NRC-approved  alternatives.  
Upon completion of the review of the risk information, defense in depth, and safety 
margins, the IDP must come to a judgement that the categorization of the SSC as 
low safety significant is justified.  If such a judgement can not be made, then the 
IDP can re-categorize the SSC to RISC-1.  In doing so, however, the attributes of the 
SSC will have to be identified to assure that any core damage prevention and 
mitigation attributes, which the IDP felt were significant, are included in future 
treatment.  
Review of RISC-4 SSCs 
The SSCs initially categorized  as RISC-4 are non-safety-related  SSCs which were 
found in the categorization process to be of low safety significance.  The IDP's role 
for these SSCs is to assure that the basis used in the categorization  is technically 
adequate.  If the IDP concludes that the categorization of the SSC as low safety 
significant is not justified, then the IDP can re-categorize  the SSC to RISC-2.  In 
doing so, however, the attributes of the SSC will have to be identified to assure that 
any core damage prevention and mitigation attributes, which the IDP felt were 
significant, are included in future treatment.
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Figure 2.4-13 
IDP PROCESS
2.4.4  Evaluation of Recommended  Changes
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The final step in the process of categorizing SSCs into risk-informed safety 
classifications involves the evaluation of the risk implications of changes in special 
treatment.  This process involves three primary components: 
"* Define Treatment Changes 
"• Conduct Sensitivity Studies of Potential Risk Implications 
"* Define Performance Monitoring Program 
In general, since one of the guiding principles of this process is that changes in treatment 
should not degrade performance for RISC-3  SSCs, and RISC-2  SSCs would be expected 
to maintain or improve in performance, it is anticipated that there would be little, if any, 
net increase in risk.  
The first step in performing this assessment involves the identification of the specific 
changes in treatment of SSCs that may impact performance.  This qualitative assessment 
should consider the specific treatment identified in the licensees programs and the 
performance monitoring established.  
The second step is to perform sensitivity studies using the available PRAs to evaluate the 
potential  impact on CDF and LERF.  This step is useful because the importance measures 
used in the initial safety significance assessment were based on the individual  SSCs 
considered.  Changes in performance can influence not only the importance measures  for 
the SSCs, which have changes in performance, but also others.  Thus, the aggregate 
impact of the changes should be evaluated to assess whether new risk insights are 
revealed.  Sensitivity studies should be realistic.  For example, increasing the unreliability 
of RISC-3 SSCs by a factor of 2 to 5 could represent a bounding impact on SSC 
performance.  Likewise, reducing the unreliability of RISC-1  and RISC-2  SSCs by a 
similar factor may be called for, depending upon the specific changes in special 
treatment.  The changes in CDF and LERF computed in such sensitivity studies should be 
compared to the risk acceptance guidelines of Reg. Guide 1.174  as a measure of their 
acceptability.  In addition, importance measures from these sensitivity studies can 
provide insight as to which SSCs and which failure modes are most significant.  
It is noted that the recommended FV and RAW threshold values used in the screening 
may be changed by the PRA team following this sensitivity study.  If the risk evaluation 
shows that the changes in CDF and LERF as a result of changes in special treatment 
requirements are not within the acceptance guidelines of the Regulatory Guide  1.174, 
then a lower FV threshold value may be needed (e.g.,  0.001)  for a re-evaluation of SSCs 
risk ranking.  This may result in re-classifying some of the candidate low safety 
significant SSCs as safety significant SSCs.  
The third step of the overall risk evaluation is to review the performance monitoring 
called for by the IDP in conjunction with the results of the risk sensitivity studies to 
determine the monitoring strategies.  This process should compare the assumptions of the 
risk sensitivity studies, the results of the sensitivity studies and the monitoring strategies 
to determine whether additional monitoring is called for in order to maintain risk within
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an acceptable regime.  For example, if the sensitivity studies indicate that, even with 
bounding  SSC performance  assumptions, the risk will remain within acceptance 
guidelines, and the bounding performance assumptions are supported by monitoring 
programs, then no changes would be necessary.  If, however, the risk sensitivity studies 
identified that changes in the performance of specific SSCs could cause the computed 
risks to exceed the acceptance guidelines, then additional monitoring may be called for.
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3  TREATMENT OF RISK-INFORMED  SAFETY CLASS STRUCTURES, 
SYSTEMS  AND  COMPONENTS 
This section addresses the application of controls and specifications for each of the four 
RISC SSC categories consistent with the safety-significance.  
Licensee personnel who are the special treatment program owners are responsible for 
making changes to the specific special treatment requirements for SSCs under review.  
As necessary and appropriate, program owners may call upon additional plant personnel 
(system, design or PRA engineers) or external consultants to assist in the resolution of 
issues and the decision making process on the application of appropriate treatment.  Once 
the program has been amended for one or more systems that have been risk-informed, the 
program changes are reviewed by the plant oversight group established for the review 
and approval of equipment modifications, and changes in procedures  and programs.  
(This task may be delegated to the IDP) 
These changes would generally be expected to maintain or improve SSC performance.  
For RISC-3 SSCs, changes in SSC treatment would be expected to have minimal impact 
on SSC performance.  Nevertheless, the licensee management (IDP) should review the 
changes for these SSCs to assess how SSC performance may be impacted.  
It is not necessary to modify or change SSC treatment just based on the results of the 
risk-informed categorization.  Before making the decision to adjust treatment 
requirements, a licensee should first review the existing controls, specifications and SSC 
performance history, if available.  An assessment is made of whether the SSC's past 
performance or existing treatment provisions (e.g., procurement,  engineering 
specifications, etc.,) provide reasonable assurance that the safety-significant functional 
requirement(s) identified in the risk-informed evaluation process, or the functions 
specifically  required by regulation or the safety analyses required by regulation will be 
satisfied.  Based on the results of these evaluations,  a licensee determines  the need  to 
adjust treatment controls consistent with the safety significance of the functional  attribute 
under review.  
NRC technical requirements and the design process for RISC-1,  RIJC-2  and RISC-3 
SSCs are not changed through implementing  Section 50.69.  Also, impiementing §50.69 
does not change the design engineering specifications.  NRC technical requirements  are 
assessed, and where necessary, improved under a separate activity, Risk-Informing NRC 
Technical  Requirements (Option 3 to SECY 98-300).  
As used in this document, the term design bases relates to the  10 CFR 50.2 definition of 
design bases.  The term "beyond design bases" relates to those functions that are not part 
of the §50.2 design bases, i.e., the design functions required by regulation.  A system's 
design may be based on power production needs, but since it is available it may also be 
used to mitigate or prevent a design bases event.  The system is not credited in the §50.2 
design bases, and therefore the function for the power production component is 
considered  "beyond the [§50.2]  design bases."  This is an example of where risk-
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informed, performance-based  regulation identifies and emphasizes latent safety 
enhancements  that are already part of the non-regulated design.  
Example:  the feedwater system is not credited with providing a safety-injection 
function, yet in some scenarios, which are not part of the §50.2 design bases, the 
feedwater system can prevent and mitigate core damage.  
3.1  TREATMENT  OF RISK-INFORMED  SAFETY CLASS  1 SSCS 
Risk-Informed Safety Class  1 SSCs are safety-related SSCs that the risk evaluation 
process has categorized  as safety significant.  
In general, there is no change to the regulatory treatment for these safety-related,  safety
significant SSCs.  
In specific  instances for a RISC-I  SSC, the risk-evaluation process may identify an 
additional or different safety-significant function that is a "beyond design bases" 
function.  These additional  safety-significant functions are documented, as appropriate, in 
the design bases documents  and the design record files.  In such cases, an engineering 
determination is made on whether the equipment could satisfy this new function.  If  there 
is not reasonable assurance that the newly identified function could be satisfied, a 
licensee has two choices:  determine the impact of not crediting the newly identified 
function, or take action to provide reasonable assurance that the newly identified safety
function will be satisfied.  
The identification and satisfaction of "beyond design bases" safety-significant functions 
enhances the current safety capabilities of the plant.  These newly credited  functions 
provide additional safety assurance beyond the current acceptable levels of safety.  As 
such, it is appropriate and acceptable  for commercial  level controls and practices to be 
applied to provide reasonable assurance that the "beyond design bases" functions will be 
satisfied.  A licensee should document the basis for determining that the SSC will satisfy 
the new safety-significant  function.  
A licensee's monitoring and corrective action program provide the necessary tools for 
assuring resolution of deficiencies and  continuing assurance that the safety-significant 
functions will be satisfied.  In addition, the update of the PRA based on operating 
experience will provide additional insights into the effectiveness of a licensee's 
categorization and corrective action programs for RISC-1  SSCs.  
Change Control Process for Beyond Design Bases Functions 
RISC-1  SSCs are subject to §50.59.  In addition, for RISC-I  SSCs that have a "beyond 
design bases" function, a licensee's configuration control program, which includes the 
§50.59 change control process,  is adjusted to include a provision that provides reasonable
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assurance that RISC-i  safety-significant  (including beyond design bases) function(s) will 
be satisfied following a facility change that involves a RISC-i  SSC.  This additional 
change control provision would remain until the process is changed in response to the 
implementation of a risk-informed §50.59 process.  
Where applicable, the additional change control provision determination  is based on 
analyses (quantitative or qualitative) or on a combined quantitative  and qualitative 
evaluation of the change and how it impacts the original design or operational bases.  The 
information contained in the modification package, and if necessary, the design record 
file, provides the detailed basis for the determination that the beyond design bases safety 
function will be satisfied.  Each proposed change is supported by engineering 
information, that may include but is not limited to, drawings, specifications, narrative 
description,  design evaluations, installation and testing requirements,  associated 
procedure changes (if any), revised analyses (if any) and similar information. This 
information, often referred to as the change package, demonstrates the safety and 
effectiveness of the change and provides the basis for management approval of its 
implementation.  
If the determination or licensee management concludes that there is insufficient assurance 
that the "beyond design basis" safety function would be satisfied following the 
implementation  of a change, a licensee assesses the change against the minimal increase 
in risk standard defined in §50.59.  
Following the completion of the evaluation, a licensee would follow the process 
described in the NEI 96-07, the implementing guidance for §50.59.  
The engineering  and operations documents associated with RISC-I  SSCs are already 
included in the scope of controlled documents  for the plant.  Information and action taken 
in response to the implementation of §50.69 relating to "beyond design bases" conditions 
should be documented in the engineering record files.  
3.1.1  Example 1: BWR Containment Vent Valves (RISC-1) 
Existing safety-related  functions include isolation of containment penetrations.  The 
valves are required to close and remain closed under desi'  '  basis conditions.  In adopting 
§50.69, the risk-informed evaluation process categorized  the vent valves as a safety
significant (RISC-1  SSC) because, in addition to the containment isolation function, the 
valves need to open in specific emergency conditions to control containment pressure to 
prevent a catastrophic failure of containment.  This is a "beyond design bases" function 
and provides an additional mitigation capability over and above that provided by the 
design bases.  It enhances the protection of public health and safety.  
An evaluation of existing engineering specifications, plant operations, design analyses, 
quality controls, and testing programs was performed to determine whether there was 
reasonable assurance that valves would open under the conditions requiring the venting 
of containment.  The conclusion was that the existing design and controls provide 
reasonable assurance that the containment vent function will be satisfied.  The plant's IST
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program was amended to include the opening function for these valves (stroke test).  No 
other changes to controls for the valves, operators and the associated supporting 
equipment (electrical power supplies, air supply & I&C) were made.  
The configuration control program, which includes the §50.59 process, was amended to 
include an evaluation of RISC-I  "beyond design bases" functions to provide reasonable 
assurance that the safety-significant functions will be satisfied following a change that 
affects the valves.  
The licensee documented  its conclusions and its basis for the determination.  The existing 
engineering records and controls (design, procurement,  etc.,...) already were included in 
the list of controlled documents and records for the plant.  
3.1.2  Example 2: PWR Pressurizer PORVs  (RISC-1) 
Existing safety-related  functions include pressure-retaining boundary and opening to 
relieve pressure.  In adopting §50.69, the risk-informed evaluation process categorized 
the PORVs as a safety-significant (RISC-1  SSC) because, in addition to the pressure 
retaining boundary, the valves can be credited to support "bleed and feed" heat removal 
capabilities, a "beyond  design bases" function.  The valve provides an additional method 
for mitigation and prevention over and above that for the designed safety-related 
function.  When credited, it provides  an enhancement to the protection of public health 
and safety.  
NOTE:  Given the availability of safety relief valves, the risk-evaluation process did not 
identify the pressure relief function as safety-significant.  
There is no change in requirements or commitments associated with the pressure
retaining function.  
The bleed and feed characteristic is not included in the [§50.2]  design bases or credited in 
the safety analyses.  An engineering evaluation  and review of existing engineering 
specifications, plant operations,  design analyses, quality controls, and testing programs 
was performed to determine whether the existing controls, including design and plant 
configuration, provide -easonable assurance that the "bleed and feed" function will be 
satisfied.  The plant's IS F program was amended to include a functional stroke test of this 
valve during a refueling outage.  The configuration control process was amended to 
evaluate changes to provide reasonable assurance that the safety-significant functions will 
be satisfied following a change that affects the valves.  
The configuration control program, which includes the §50.59 process, was amended to 
include an evaluation of RISC-i  "beyond design bases" functions to provide reasonable 
assurance that the safety-significant  functions will be satisfied following a change that 
affects the valves.  
No other changes were made to controls for the valves and the associated supporting 
equipment (electrical power supplies & I&C).
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The licensee documented its conclusions  and its basis for the determination. The existing 
engineering records and controls (design, procurement, etc .... ) already were included in 
the list of controlled documents and records for the plant.  
3.1.3  Example 3: Isolation Valves on the Suction Line of the Startup Auxiliary Feedwater 
Pump (RISC-I) 
The existing safety-related  function for these valves is to close and remain closed after a 
seismic event to perform this isolation and prevent draining of the safety related water 
source.  The §50.69 risk-informed evaluation process identified an additional safety
significant function.  The startup auxiliary feedwater pump is an important source of 
feedwater following most reactor trips and the isolation valves must be open, and remain 
open to support the newly identified function.  
NOTE:  The two safety related isolation valves are provided  on the suction line of the 
startup auxiliary feedwater pump to isolate the seismic designed water source from the 
non-seismic startup pump.  The startup auxiliary feedwater pump is a non-safety-related, 
non-seismic pump that uses the same water source as the safety related auxiliary 
feedwater pumps.  
Existing maintenance, operating and testing procedures, plus design and procurement 
specifications were evaluated.  The valves were normally tested every quarter.  The test 
procedure was expanded to include a test of the opening function  at the same periodicity.  
Future activities (procurement, maintenance, modifications,  etc.) on these valves would 
be performed  in accordance with the current RISC-1  requirements.  
The configuration control program, which includes the §50.59 process, was amended to 
include an evaluation of RISC-1  "beyond design bases" functions to provide reasonable 
assurance that the safety-significant  functions will be satisfied following  a change that 
affects the valves.  
The licensee documents  its conclusions and its basis for the determination.  The existing 
engineering  records and controls (design, procurement,  etc....) already were included in 
the list of controlled documents and records for the plant.  
3.2  TREATMENT  OF RISK-INFORNIED  SAFETY CLASS  2 SSCS 
RISC-2 SSCs are nonsafety-related SSCs that a Section 50.69 risk-informed  evaluation 
process has determined to be safety-significant 
The identification and satisfaction the RISC-2 safety-significant  functions enhances the 
current safety capabilities of the plant. These newly credited functions provide additional 
safety assurance beyond the current acceptable levels of safety.  As such, it is appropriate 
and acceptable for commercial  level controls and practices to be applied to provide 
reasonable assurance that the safety-significant functions will be satisfied.  The basis for 
determining that a RISC-2 SSC will satisfy a newly identified safety-significant function
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is documented in an engineering evaluation.  If a licensee determines  that there is not 
reasonable assurance that the safety-significant function could be satisfied, a licensee has 
two choices:  determine the impact of not crediting the newly identified function, or take 
action to provide reasonable assurance that the function will be satisfied.  
For a majority of licensees, the only changes associated with the programs for RISC-2 
SSCs are linked to a licensee's configuration control and NRC reporting programs.  With 
the exception of these two areas, the same regulatory requirements  (§50.49,  §50.63, 
§50.65 etc.,) and associated commitments are applied to the same extent to RISC-2 SSCs 
as prior to the implementation of the risk-informed categorization process.  
For RISC-2 SSCs, a performance monitoring program plus existing (commercial (BOP) 
and, as applicable, augment quality) controls and specifications are sufficient.  For a 
majority of licensees, the monitoring program established by the maintenance rule is 
sufficient for assuring that the safety-significant  functions will be satisfied providing the 
maintenance rule performance criteria were based on functional failures, and not just 
maintenance preventable functional failures.  
If a licensee's maintenance rule performance criteria were established only using 
maintenance-preventable  functional failures (MPFFs), a licensee should review and, 
where appropriate, establish new performance thresholds for RISC-2  SSCs.  A review 
should be performed to establish the performance history record and to assure the correct 
controls are in place.  As applicable, the review may include: 
(i)  PRA assumptions and conclusions; 
(ii)  Performance history; 
(iii)  Maintenance history; 
(iv)  Record of deficiencies; 
(v)  Existing work practices, procedures,  and quality controls; 
(vi)  Material certification,  tests or analyses; 
(vii)  Procurement history; 
(viii) Engineering (including service conditions)  and procurement specifications.  
NOTE:  For many licensees, the review of the PRA functions and assumptions should 
provide sufficient information.  The performance of safety functions by nonsafety-related 
SSCs to prevent or mitigate conditions,  which are "beyond design bases" events, is 
included in PRAs based on various justifications.  The availability of a nonsafety-related 
SSC to potentially perform  a "beyond design bases" safety-significant function is based 
on consultation with design or systems engineering groups.  Generally, if engineering 
judgement  is used, the PRA uses success criteria on SSC performance to evaluate 
whether the SSC can provide the function under the service conditions required.  
Uncertainty in this judgment is compensated by assigning a probability of failure to the 
SSC performance.  In general, engineering judgment is based on operating history or 
knowledge of SSC or similar equipment performance  under conditions, which may 
approximate to those represented by the PRA; e.g., a previous unusual event involving 
water passage through valves whose usual service conditions involve steam flow.
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External data sources such as IDCOR, NRC research publications, Licensee Event 
Reports (LERs),  and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) reports may be 
consulted to determine if there is a precedent  showing the SSC can perform as needed.  
Although these techniques are not as rigorous as traditional engineering specifications 
and testing, they provide reasonable assurance for the low probability service conditions 
being considered.  
Based on the above information, a licensee can determine the optimum and practical 
performance criteria that will provide reasonable assurance that the safety-significant 
functions defined in the risk-informed evaluation process are satisfied.  Also, such a 
review documents the controls and specifications that provide reasonable assurance that 
the additional safety-significant  functions will be satisfied.  
A licensee's monitoring and corrective action programs provide the necessary tools for 
assuring resolution of deficiencies and continuing assurance that the safety-significant 
functions will be satisfied.  In addition, the update of the PRA based on operating 
experience will provide additional  insights into the effectiveness of a licensee's 
categorization and corrective action programs for RISC-2 SSCs.  
A licensee's commercial  (BOP) controls are dispersed throughout the licensee's 
documentation; in department orders, procedures,  and training programs.  Appendix A to 
this guideline provides examples of the type of activities that should be included in 
commercial  control programs.  Repair and replacement activities would be governed by 
the original code of construction and engineering specifications.  
Changes to controls and specifications for RISC-2  SSCs are documented.  The design and 
operations documents for RISC-2 SSCs are added to the scope of controlled documents 
for the plant, if they are not part of the controlled documentation process.  Information 
and action taken in response to the implementation of §50.69 relating to "beyond design 
bases" conditions  should be documented in the engineering record  files.  
For RISC-2  SSCs that are already governed by regulations, such as 10 CFR 50.49, 
Environmental  qualification of electric equipment important to safety for nuclear  power 
plants; 10  CFR 50.62, Requirements  for reduction of risk  from anticipated  transients 
without scram (ATWSý  •  vents for light-water-cooled  nuclear  power plants; and  10 CFR 
50.63, Loss of all alternating  current  power; the existing controls, sometimes known as 
"augment quality controls", defined in regulatory guidance documents, such as 
Regulatory Guide 1.155, would continue to be applied.  
For new seismic or other environmental  attributes identified by the §50.69 risk-informed 
evaluation process, a licensee would evaluate the ability of the SSC to satisfy the 
identified safety-function (including the service condition requirements) using a 
commercial  standard of assurance, i.e., standard balance-of-plant  criteria.  The process 
would be based on an engineering specification and review to determine that the SSC 
would operate satisfactorily under the specified environmental  conditions.  Vendor
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specifications or licensee evaluations  should be sufficient, and generally testing would 
not be required.  
For RISC-2 SSCs that are associated with a "beyond design bases" function, a provision 
is added to a licensee's configuration  control program, which includes  the §50.59 change 
control process.  This new provision requires an evaluation to reasonably assure that the 
newly identified safety-significant  function (including the service condition) will be 
satisfied following a change to facility (equipment or procedures)  that affect RISC-2 
SSCs (See RISC- 1 Section for additional details).  This additional  control provision is 
necessary because, apart from specific regulations that focus on nonsafety-related  SSCs, 
such as,  §50.62,  and §50.49, the current §50.59 process focuses on design bases, not 
"beyond design bases" functions.  This additional change control provision would remain 
until the process is changed in response to the implementation of a risk-informed  §50.59 
process.  
NRC §50.73, Licensee event report  system, requirements are modified per §50.69.  
For a licensee adopting §50.69,  a licensee shall submit a licensee event report 
consistent with the requirements in §50.73(b)  for an event or condition that alone 
prevented the satisfaction of the §50.69 RISC-2  SSC safety-significant function 
Events covered may include one or more procedural errors, equipment failures, and/or 
discovery of design, analysis, fabrication, construction, and/or procedural inadequacies.  
Component failures need not be reported if redundant equipment was available to 
perform the required safety function.  
10 CFR Part 21  does not apply to RISC-2 SSCs because they are not "basic components." 
This is consistent with the existing Part 21  regime, where Part 21  is not applicable to 
nonsafety-related SSCs that are currently governed by the regulations, e.g. §50.49 and 
§50.65.  
3.2.1  Example 1: Alternate AC Gas Turbine Generators  (GTGs) (RISC-2) 
Prior to the implementation of 50.69 the GTGs were considered "important to 
safety", but were not categorized  as safety-related.  They were included in the 
scope of the maintenance  rule.  They were recognized  as safety significant 
because of their role in the mitigation of station blackout events 
The §50.69 risk-informed categorization process identified the following function as 
safety-significant:  Start and load by local operator action within one hour of the start of a 
station blackout event (maintenance of vital auxiliaries).  This is consistent with the 
existing design function for this system.
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The §50.65 monitoring program established performance criteria based on all failures, 
not just maintenance  preventable functional failures.  No changes to performance 
monitoring were required.  
An evaluation of the existing controls determined the quality assurance requirements  of 
Regulatory Guide 1.155  (August 1988), Appendix A have been applied to this system.  
The current equipment performance demonstrates that the existing controls have been 
adequate to maintain the safety-significant function.  No changes were made to the 
existing controls.  
Alternate AC requirements are included in the scope of §50.59.  No additional 
configuration control processes needed to be established.  
The licensee documented its conclusions and its basis for the determination.  The existing 
engineering records and controls (design, procurement,  etc....) already are included in the 
list of controlled documents and records for the plant.  
3.2.2  Example 2: Instrument Air System (RISC-2) 
Prior to the implementation of 50.69, the Instrument Air system was categorized  as 
nonsafety-related  and not "important to safety".  The system was included in the scope of 
the Maintenance rule.  The §50.69 risk-informed evaluation process identified the system 
as safety significant with trip initiation under specific conditions as a safety significant 
function that is not included in the design bases of the facility.  The specific trip 
initiations cause a scram with complicated  actions because of the complexities of plant 
operation with a loss of instrument air.  The risk-informed evaluation process identified a 
potential improvement to the safety profile of the plant that is beyond the design bases of 
the facility.  The implementation of §50.69 enhanced the protection of public health and 
safety.  
A review was performed of the current performance monitoring for this system.  The 
current performance criteria monitored this system at the plant level and considered all 
failr%--  of the system.  This monitoring was determined  appropriate for the safety 
signil,;ant function identified during the risk-informed evaluation.  The current system 
performance  was reviewed and found to be acceptable,  so no additional controls were 
imposed.  
The configuration control process was amended to include an evaluation of changes made 
to the Instrument  Air system to provide reasonable  assurance that changes to the system 
would continue to satisfy the performance criterion.  
The conclusions and its basis for the determination were documented.  The existing 
engineering records and controls (design, procurement, etc.,...) were added to the list of 
controlled documents  and records for the plant.
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3.2.3  Example 3: BWR Feedwater Pumps (RISC-2) 
In a BWR, prior to the implementation of §50.69, the feedwater pumps were categorized 
as nonsafety-related SSCs, yet were included in the scope of the maintenance  rule.  In 
adopting §50.69, the risk-informed evaluation process categorized the feedwater pumps 
as safety-significant (RISC-2 SSCs) because they can be used to prevent and mitigate 
potential core damage events in scenarios that are not included in the design bases.  These 
pumps provide additional methods for mitigation over and above the designed safety 
systems.  When credited, they provide an enhancement to the protection of public health 
and safety.  
The risk-informed evaluation identified the following functions as safety significant: 
*  Pressure boundary, and 
*  Water injection into reactor pressure vessel.  
The pumps are already included in the maintenance rule monitoring program.  However, 
the licensee established the performance criteria based on only maintenance preventable 
functional failures, not on safety-significant failures.  As a result, the licensee developed 
new performance  criteria and controls for §50.69 implementation that also encompass the 
performance monitoring criteria for the maintenance rule.  The licensee reviewed the 
following documentation: 
*  PRA assumptions and conclusions associated with the feedwater pumps; 
*  Performance history,; 
*  Maintenance history; 
*  Record of deficiencies; 
*  Existing work practices, procedures,  and quality controls; 
*  Procurement history; and 
*  Engineering and procurement  specifications.  
Based on these reviews new performance criteria were established.  No changes to the 
controls for these pumps were necessary to provide assurance that the safety significant 
functional  requirements would be satisfied.  The basis was that the performance credited 
in the PRA to inject water was the same as the performance of the pumps to satisfy their 
function during normal operation.  The performance is confirmed during pre-operational 
startup testing and continuously during normal operation.  Existing testing, monitoring 
and corrective action practices provide reasonable assurance that the injection credited in 
the PRA will be available.  
The configuration control program, which includes the §50.59 process, was amended  to 
require an evaluation to reasonably  assure that the "beyond design bases" functions of the 
will be satisfied.
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The existing engineering records and procedural controls (vendor manuals, procurement 
specifications,  maintenance  schedules and procedures) already were included in the list of 
controlled documents for the plant.  
3.2.4  Example 4: PWR Nonsafety-Related 4kv AC Power Buses (RISC-2) 
In a PWR, prior to the adoption of §50.69, several 4kv power buses were categorized as 
nonsafety-related,  yet were included in the scope of §50.65.  In adopting §50.69, the risk
informed evaluation process categorized  these 4kv AC power buses as safety-significant 
RISC-2.  The basis for this determination was that these power sources may be used in 
"beyond design bases" configurations to prevent and mitigate an accident by providing 
power to components that could be used as an alternative method to safely shutdown the 
plant (e.g., use of condensate pumps as an alternate injection path for "beyond design 
bases" events).  
These nonsafety-related  4kv buses are already included in the monitoring program for the 
maintenance rule.  Both unavailability and reliability (in terms of safety functional 
failures) performance criteria are included in the §50.65 monitoring program.  The 
licensee's maintenance rule performance criteria are based on all failures, not just on 
those related to maintenance preventable functional failures.  No additional monitoring 
was needed to provide reasonable assurance that the safety function would be satisfied.  
An existing evaluation had concluded that the 4kV buses would satisfy the safety
significant function.  In view of the history in satisfying the maintenance  rule 
performance criteria, no additional evaluations or controls were needed.  
Future modifications or repairs to these 4kv AC power buses would be performed under 
the existing documented procedural  control (commercial/balance-of-plant  controls and 
processes).  The configuration  control program, which includes the §50.59 process, was 
amended  to require an evaluation to reasonably assure that the "beyond design bases" 
functions of the will be satisfied for a change to a RISC-2 SSC.  
The existing engineering records and procedural controls (vendor manuals, procurement 
specifications, maintenance  schedules and procedures) already were included in the list of 
controlled documents  for the plant.  
3.2.5  Example 5: PWR Normal Chilled Water System (RISC-2) 
In a PWR, prior to the adoption of §50.69, normal chilled water (NCW) system was 
categorized  as nonsafety-related and was included in the scope of the maintenance rule.  
In adopting §50.69, the risk-informed evaluation process identified (IDP decision) the 
NCW as safety-significant  RISC-2 because this system could fail safety-related 
components that rely on normal HVAC systems as an alternate to emergency HVAC 
systems for operability.  
NOTE:  The NCW system is modeled in the plant PRA, yet based  solely on the PRA, the 
system would not be categorized  as safety-significant  (there are no safety-significant 
components associated with this system).
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The NCW system is already included in the monitoring program for the maintenance 
rule.  Both unavailability and reliability (in terms of safety functional failures) 
performance criteria are included in the §50.65 program.  The maintenance rule 
performance criteria are based on all failures, not just on those related to maintenance 
preventable functional failures.  No additional  monitoring is needed to provide reasonable 
assurance that the safety function would be satisfied.  
In view of the history in satisfying the maintenance  rule performance  criteria, no 
additional controls were needed.  
Future modifications or repairs to the NCW would be performed under the existing 
documented procedural control (commercial/balance-of-plant  controls and processes).  
The configuration  control program, which includes  the §50.59 process, was amended to 
require an evaluation  to reasonably assure that the "beyond design bases" functions of the 
will be satisfied for changes to RISC-2 SSCs.  
The existing engineering records and procedural controls (vendor manuals, procurement 
specifications, maintenance  schedules and procedures) already were included in the list of 
controlled documents for the plant.  
3.3  TREATMENT OF RISK-INFORMED  SAFETY CLASS  3 SSCs 
RISC-3  SSCs are safety-related  SSCs that have been categorized as not being safety
significant under the risk-informed evaluation methodology and that are directly  and 
specifically referenced  in a regulation or in a licensee's safety analyses (e.g., FSAR 
Chapter 15 analyses) required by regulation.  
These SSCs are the subject of the following licensing commitment that supercedes  all 
previous RISC-3 SSC commitments.  
The application of a commercial  level performance monitoring program or, where 
monitoring is not appropriate or practical, commercial level controls to provide 
reasonable assurance that the SSC functional requirements, that are directly and 
specifically referenced  or described in a regulation, or in the assumptions  and 
conclusions of the plant specific safety analyses required by regulation, will be 
satisfied.  
This is consistent with NEI 99-04,  Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes 
(in process of being amended) that permits a licensee to change commitments associated 
with low safety-significant  SSCs (RISC-3 or RISC-4 SSCs).  No other regulatory 
commitments are applicable to these SSCs because they have been categorized  as not 
having safety significance.
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Where appropriate, RISC-3 SSC performance would be monitored against functional 
criteria set to provide reasonable  assurance that the functions directly referenced  in the 
regulations, or directly and specifically referenced  in the safety analyses required by 
regulation will be satisfied. Such performance criteria would be at the plant, system, train 
or component level.  
If new functionality criteria need to be established, the criteria would be set by first 
determining the specific regulatory functional requirement or safety analyses function.  A 
review is then performed of the following documentation: 
"*  The applicable regulation(s) and regulatory guidance document(s), 
"•  PRA assumptions and conclusions, 
"*  Performance history; 
"*  Record of deficiencies, 
The licensee then establishes functional criteria for the SSC that when satisfied provide 
reasonable assurance that the functions required by the specific regulation, or the plant 
specific safety analyses required by regulation will be satisfied.  A comparison of the 
SSCs performance history against the new functional criteria should be made.  
Failures to satisfy the RISC-3 functional  performance criteria are addressed and resolved 
through a licensee's corrective action program.  Monitoring and the licensee's corrective 
action program provide the necessary tools for assuring resolution of deficiencies and 
continuing assurance that the functions required by the applicable regulation will be 
satisfied.  In addition, the update of the PRA will provide additional insights into the 
effectiveness of the categorization and the licensee's corrective action program for 
RISC-3  SSCs.  
Where monitoring is inappropriate or impractical, existing commercial (BOP) controls 
and procedures are used to provide reasonable assurance that the required function will 
be satisfied.  A review of procurement specifications, existing work controls and 
practices is performed  to determine that there is reasonable assurance that the SSC will 
operate satisfactorily in accordance with the engineering specifications described  in the 
design record file.  
As appropriate, environmental  attributes, e.g., water immersion, seismic, fire, or harsh 
environment, are included in procurement specifications for replacement parts.  In such 
cases condition monitoring and inspection would be sufficient for issues such as, seismic 
two-over-one conditions for RISC-3  SSCs, where component anchorage would be 
inspected.  
In procuring components that have seismic requirements, reference  should be made to 
commercial  consensus standards that have been developed for commercial non-nuclear 
applications in seismic areas.  If there is no appropriate consensus standard, an
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evaluation6 would be performed to provide reasonable  (commercial level) assurance that 
the SSC would be able to satisfy the required seismic functional criteria.  Guidance for 
such evaluations is provided in consensus standards and in EPRI XXX (industry 
document under review).  
For operations  in adverse environmental  service conditions (EQ considerations),  the use 
or reference to nationally recognized standards should be considered, or an evaluation 
should be performed to provide reasonable assurance that the function(s) required by the 
regulation, or by the safety analyses that are required by regulation would be satisfied in 
the designed service conditions.  Standard commercial  controls, practices  and 
qualification procedures, are sufficient, i.e., vendor specifications or licensee analyses 
should be sufficient, and generally testing would not be required.  Vendor activities and 
procedures would be reviewed,  as necessary, through a licensee's commercial vendor 
audit program.  Specifically, one or a combination of the following methods would be 
used.  (See EPRI XXX for more detailed guidance -document being reviewed by 
industry) 
"  Reference to vendor documentation (catalogues, product sheets, certificate of 
conformance) that indicate that the product would operate in accordance with the 
procurement  specifications in the service conditions  defined by the design record  file 
"*  A commercial  level (BOP)  equivalency evaluation that determines the procured item 
is equivalent to the item being replaced and will satisfy the design requirements.  
"  A commercial  level (BOP) engineering evaluation, where existing information does 
not provide sufficient assurance that the product would satisfy the required 
function(s) in the service conditions defined by the design record file.  
Full compliance with Appendix B to Part 50 is not necessary or required because RISC-3 
SSCs are of low or no safety-significance.  A licensee's commercial  (BOP) control 
programs are sufficient.  In general,  commercial programs have similar elements to 
Appendix B,  with less emphasis on documentation and process.  Appendix A provides an 
example of the important elements that are included in a licensee's commercial  (BOP) 
control program.  
As appropriate and necessary,  controls, monitoring criteria, procedures  and work 
practices are adjusted,  as determined by the licensee, to take into account operating 
experiences and plant deficiencies.  Documentation is at a level commensurate with 
commercial equipment and activities.  
Under Option 2, RISC-3 the functional design bases are not changed.  However, a 
licensee that chooses to include §50.55a in the matrix of regulations adopted under 
§50.69 would not be required by NRC regulations to apply ASME requirements to RISC
6 An evaluation is defined as an analysis (traditional or computer calculations),  a review of test data, a qualitative 
engineering evaluation, or a review of operational experience, or any combination of these elements.
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3 SSCs.  For those SSCs, where the licensee has analyzed the functional significance of 
the SSC (e.g.,  surrogate modeling), but not the effects of the passive pressure boundary 
failure (i.e., indirect effects), the licensee should use the original construction code 
requirements or, as an alternative, other nationally recognized non nuclear Codes, 
Standards or Specifications suitable for that item (e.g.,  B31 series for piping, B 16.34 for 
valves) in performing a repair or replacement  activity on an item in that system.  Use of 
the nationally recognized non-nuclear Codes, Standards and Specifications provides 
equivalence in construction and installation requirements albeit with some decreased 
assurance (e.g.,  lesser NDE, administrative requirements).  (Additional  guidance is 
provided in the ASME Section XI, Repair/Replacement,  code case, which is under 
development.) 
In contrast, the licensee may analyze both the functional significance (i.e., direct effects) 
and indirect effects of the pressure boundary failure of the SSCs in that system. If they 
conclude that the items in that system can be classified  as RISC-3 based on this expanded 
analysis, then the licensee can perform repair or replacement activities to engineering 
specifications  or standards developed by the licensee.  
It should be noted that while §50.55a and ASME requirements  are not applicable to 
RISC-3  SSCs from a NRC regulatory perspective, there may be local and state 
requirements that may require  a licensee to adopt a specific code or standard 
10 CFR Part 21  does not apply to RISC-3 SSCs.  A failure of a RISC-3 SSC, which is not 
safety-significant, could not result in a substantial  safety hazard, a governing criteria in 
defining the scope of SSCs subject to Part 21.  
10 CFR 50.59 would continue to apply to RISC-3  SSCs until the specific design bases 
that are linked to the RISC 3 SSCs are changed under the project for risk-informing NRC 
technical requirements.  
For safety-related  SSCs that are categorized  as RISC-3, yet are not directly referenced in 
a regulation or directly and specifically referenced in the safety analyses required by 
regulation, the licensee has the option of reclassifying these as RISC-4 SSCs on 
completion of a §50.59 evaluation.  
3.3.1  Example 1: Low Pressure Core Spray System (RISC-3) 
Prior to the adoption of §50.69, the Low Pressure Core Spray system was categorized as 
safety-related and was included in the scope of the maintenance rule.  In adopting §50.69, 
the risk-informed  evaluation process classified the system as RISC-3, based on 
consideration  of both direct and indirect effects.  The analysis of direct effects led to a 
low safety significance  conclusion because of redundancy with LPCI under realistic 
success criteria. A walk-through was performed  and it was determined that there would 
be no adverse impact due to indirect effects of a failure of the pressure boundary.
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The licensee's maintenance rule monitoring program established performance criteria 
based on all functional failure modes, not just on those associated with maintenance 
preventable functional failures.  As a result, the licensee adopted the same functional 
performance  thresholds.  A licensing commitment (part of the general commitment  for 
RISC-3  SSCs) was made to monitor the LPCS trains to the same functional criteria as 
established by the maintenance rule.  This single commitment  superceded all previous 
commitments associated with this system.  
The program controls were adjusted to make them consistent with the licensee 
commercial  (BOP) activities.  
The licensee selected  §50.55a as one of the regulations  adopted as part of the §50.69 
implementation.  As a result, the licensee developed  a specific testing, inspection, repair 
and replacement program for the system which superceded  the ASME Section XI and 
ASME O&M requirements.  No other changes were made to the engineering or 
procurement  specifications.  
Subsequent to the adoption of §50.69, the system required replacement  components.  
Replacement parts were procured to the same design engineering specifications using 
commercial controls and procedures.  Procurement documentation included a 
manufacturer's  certification relating to the ability of the pump to satisfy the functional 
performance requirements.  The repairs and post-maintenance testing were carried out in 
accordance  with commercial balance-of-plant procedures.  
If the licensee had only analyzed the direct effects of failures of SSCs in the system and a 
valve needed to be replaced, the replacement valve would be designed  and installed to 
satisfy the original construction code or ANSI B 16.34.  
3.3.2  Example 2: Electrical Power Supply System for Containment Spray System (RISC
3) 
Prior to the adoption of §50.69, the electrical system for the Containment Spray system 
was categorized  as safety-related  and was included in the scope of the maintenance rule.  
In adopting §50.69, the risk-informed  evaluation process categorized the system as RISC
3.  
In developing the performance criteria for the maintenance rule, the licensee included 
electrical  distribution systems as a supporting element for each train.  The licensee 
adopted the same maintenance rule performance criteria for its RISC-3 monitoring 
program.  
With the exception of the pump motor and power cabling, the electrical system is located 
outside of containment in a mild environment.  
For the pump-motors  and cabling, work controls and procedures were changed  to 
commercial practices.  Qualification  and documentation to 10 CFR 50.49 requirements
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and standards  are not required, but documented vendor specifications  and, where 
necessary, analyses are performed to provide reasonable assurance that the equipment 
will operate in the anticipated operational  environment.  
In regard to the breakers and motor control  switchgear, work continues to be performed 
using the same controls and procedures as prior to the adoption of §50.69,  i.e., safety
related procedures and controls.  
For spare parts, manufacturer specifications supported, where necessary, with analyses 
that provide reasonable assurance that the spare parts satisfy the engineering and 
procurement  specification is sufficient.  Part 21  is not applicable to the cabling and motor 
because they are of low safety-significance  and a failure could not present a substantial 
safety hazard.  
The §50.59 change control process still applies.  
3.3.3  Example 3: Hydrogen Recombiners (RISC-3) 
Prior to the adoption of §50.69, the hydrogen recombiners for a PWR with a large, dry 
containment were categorized as safety-related  and were included in the scope of the 
maintenance rule because they are safety-related  SSCs.  (The PRA and maintenance rule 
expert panel deliberations classified these SSCs as low risk-significant).  In adopting 
§50.69, the risk-informed evaluation process classified the hydrogen recombiners as 
RISC-3 because their loss would not impact the plant risk profile in terms of CDF or 
LERF.  Additionally, loss of this function would not have impacted the plant safety 
functions, nor would it have contributed  to a credible core damage or a release of fission 
products.  
The licensee's maintenance rule monitoring program  established performance  criteria 
based on all failure modes, not just on those associated with maintenance preventable 
functional  failures.  As such, the licensee adopted the same functional criteria for §50.69.  
A licensing commitment (part of the general  commitment for RISC-3 SSCs) was made to 
monitor the hydrogen recombiners to the same functional  criteria as that established by 
§50.65.  This single commitment superceded all previous commitments.  
Program  controls were adjusted to make them consistent with standard balance-of-plant 
activities.  Electrical controls and work practices were adjusted to those of the licensee's 
commercial  (BOP) programs up to the first isolation device.  For spare parts, 
manufacturer certification that the spare parts satisfy the engineering and procurement 
specification is sufficient.  Part 21  is not applicable because the SSCs are of low safety
significance and a failure of the SSC could not present a substantial safety hazard.  
Following the issuance of a final rule on §50.44, which deleted the requirement for 
hydrogen recombiners in large-dry containments, the licensee performed a §50.59 to 
reclassify these SSCs as RISC-4.
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3.4  TREATMENT  OF RISK-INFORMED  SAFETY CLASS  4 SSCs 
Risk-Informed  Safety Class 4 SSCs are categorized as not being safety-significant and 
are not safety-related.  These SSCs are not subject to NRC regulations7.  
NOTE:  This category of SSCs is included in the scope of NRC oversight programs to the 
extent that a failure of a RISC 4 SSC degrades a safety-significant (RISC I or RISC 2) 
structure, system or component to the extent that the associated safety-significant 
function cannot be satisfied.  
7 This category of SSCs is included in the scope of NRC oversight programs if a failure of a RISC 4 
structure, system or component resulted in a failure of a safety-significant  functional requirement.
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4  DOCUMENTATION  & APPROVAL 
To facilitate the NRC staffs review to ensure that the analyses  conducted were 
sufficient to conclude that the key principles of risk-informed regulation have 
been met, documentation of the evaluation process and findings are expected to 
be maintained.  The integrated decision process should be documented  to include, 
descriptions  and justifications of deviations from this guidance, references to 
sources of information and data, assumptions, limitations, weighting factors 
relative to operating modes and risk sources, decision tools applied, analytical 
techniques, resolution of conflicts between deterministic  and risk evaluation 
results, resolution of differences of expert judgement, complete description of 
evaluation results, and performance monitoring program.  Documentation  will 
also include procedures that govern the integrated decision process including 
specifications  on the IDP and its activities.  
The following shall be documented and available for NRC review: 
"* Results of the relative risk importance of SSCs modeled in the PRA including 
the results of sensitivity analyses.  
"* Results of the final SSC categorization including a summary of IDP 
deliberations  for each safety-related  SSC classified as low safety significant 
and each non-safety-related SSC classified as safety significant.  Decision 
criteria in terms of qualitative assessments, assessments  for initiating events 
and plant operating modes not modeled in the PRA, defense-in-depth, and 
safety margins must be included.  Technical basis documents used to support 
the categorization shall also be available.  For safety-related  SSCs which are 
classified as RISC-1,  i.e., their classification is unchanged  and no new safety 
significant attributes have been identified, existing documentation is sufficient 
and does not need to be revised.  
"  Functional requirements for each SSC receiving revised treatment, the original 
treatment requirements for these SSCs, the revised requirements for these 
SSCs, target values for SSC reliability and availability, and the process that 
will be used to assure these functional requirements  and target values will be 
preserved/met.  
"  The assessment (qualitative and/or quantitative) of the overall change in plant 
risk as a result of changes in treatment requirements, including the baseline 
CDF and LERF and the change in this CDF and LERF.  
"  Requirements for the IDP including, the plant procedure, expertise, 
membership, training, and decision-making guidelines.  Meeting minutes 
should also be included.
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*  The PRA and other supporting analyses, together with a description of 
justification of the quality and applicability of these analyses.  
This documentation  should be maintained by the licensee, as a controlled record, 
so that it is available for examination.  Documentation of the analyses conducted 
to support changes should be maintained as lifetime quality records in accordance 
with Regulatory Guide 1.33.  
NRC Review and Approval 
As per  10 CFR 50.69, a licensee wishing to adopt a risk-informed SSC scope will 
notify the Commission in writing of its intent to implement this voluntary option.  
The notification letter will list: 
"* the regulations being adopted; 
"* the implementing methodology; and 
"* a general schedule for implementation.  
If the risk-informed evaluation methodology is different from that described in 
this guideline, the notification letter will include a copy of the licensee's risk
informed methodology.  The notification and, where applicable, the methodology 
will be regarded as accepted by the Commission upon receipt of a letter to this 
effect from the appropriate reviewing office (NRR) or 60 days after submittal to 
the Commission, whichever occurs first.  
PERIODIC REVIEW 
At intervals not exceeding 36 months, or when appropriate,  a licensee should 
conduct a review of the SSC categorization to take into account operating 
experience (industry-wide and plant-specific),  risk-insights, and plant 
modifications. The review should determine the necessity of updating the list of 
safety-significant  SSCs.  The review should encompass the following elements: 
"* Review of, or update of the plant specific PRA to reflect changes in plant 
configuration, operations,  and plant specific operating experience.  If generic 
industry data has been used in the risk-informed evaluation process, then a 
review of industry operating experience and other pertinent databases should 
be performed.  
"* Review of changes to plant activities that could impact the categorization 
results.  
"  Review of plant specific operating experience and data that could impact the 
categorization results.
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"* Assessment of the impact of the three elements listed above on the risk
informed SSC categorization by the Integrated Decision Process Panel 
"* Recommendations  to change categorization.
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APPENDIX  A 
EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL PROGRAM ELEMENTS IN A 
LICENSEE'S COMMERCIAL  CONTROL PROGRAM FOR 
RISC-2, RISC-3, AND  RISC-4 SSCS 
Introduction 
Many plants do not have a specific procedure of program labeled "commercial quality 
program."  Rather, such programs and procedures are disseminated  in numerous plant 
programs and procedures.  When combined together, as a whole, these program elements 
assure that the proposed commercial treatment provides reasonable assurance that the 
RISC-2 safety-significant  functions and the RISC-3 required (safety and regulatory) 
functions will be satisfied..  These programs are currently in place, and provide an 
effective means of addressing the special treatment controls  for RISC-2  and RISC-3 
SSCs.  In many instances, such programs and procedures are a subset of the more formal 
10 CFR 50, Appendix B quality programs 
The following control  element summaries are the central and important segments of a 
typical licensee's commercial  control program.  They are provided for information, not 
guidance.  
I.  Monitoring and Assessment Program 
Monitors structures systems and components to provide reasonable assurance  that the 
safety-significant,  power production and required regulatory functions will be satisfied.  
It provides input into the facility assessment and maintenance  rule, 10 CFR 50.65, 
programs.  
Assessments  are implemented to provide adequate  assurance that the performance  criteria 
and processes are being achieved and implemented effectively.  The type, frequency and 
degree of specificity of assessments are determined by the importance to tht. ý.  ifety 
functions and the performance history of structures, systems, components, or the work 
activity being evaluated.  
Assessments may be in the form of reviews, monitoring, tests, surveillances,  inspections, 
audits or examinations,  as appropriate. These assessments are performed by line 
organizations or personnel, by management, or by independent internal or external 
organizations or groups. The importance to the safety function and performance history 
determines the degree of management and technical oversight. Personnel performing 
assessments  are qualified through training, work experience,  or certification.
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II.  Corrective Action Program 
Defects and deviations from the prescribed performance  criteria or work processes are 
identified and communicated to the appropriate levels of management  for corrective 
action, in a timely manner.  When necessary,  controls and processes  are available to stop 
work while the appropriate level of management resolves a deviation or concern.  
Satisfactory accomplishment of corrective actions shall be confirmed by the appropriate 
level of line management  consistent with the importance of the defect or deficiency.  
Evaluation of Deviations 
Documented deviations from design specifications, performance criteria or work 
processes are evaluated commensurate with the importance to the safety significant 
functions, power production goals, and personnel safety.  As appropriate and 
commensurate with the importance of the defect or deficiency,  the evaluation considers 
the cause of the deviation, the significance and extent of the defect or deficiency in the 
work activity, with input from the appropriate personnel  associated with the activity in 
which the deviation was identified 
Resolution of Deviations 
Documented deviations shall be resolved by the responsible organizations to an extent, 
and in a manner, that is consistent with the importance of the structure, system, 
component or activity.  Activities associated with correcting deviations shall continue 
until the performance criteria have been satisfied, or until appropriate levels of 
management justify and authorize changes to the original performance criteria.  
III.  Maintenance Program 
Incorporates the requirements to support 10 CFR 50.65 and includes the preventative 
maintenance (PM) and the predictive maintenance program.  
A.  Maintenance Rule Program 
Implements the Maintenance Rule at the ctation, including SSC scoping and monitoring, 
classifying SSC performance in accordance with criteria and goals, ensuring proper 
corrective actions when performance criteria are not met, and periodically evaluating 
overall program performance.  
Note: The maintenance rule program provides a basis for the performance monitoring 
program for RISC-3  SSCs 
B.  The Preventive Maintenance (PM) 
Program provides for the identification, scheduling, and assessment of routine preventive 
maintenance activities on RISC-4, RISC-3 and, where appropriate, RISC-2 SSCs.  The 
PM program focuses on maintenance  activities that assure SSCs will continue to satisfy
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the designed functions.  As appropriate, PM activities encompass important design 
elements, historical performance,  and established maintenance practices.  PM activities 
include, where appropriate, routine maintenance checks, inspections, replacements,  tests, 
adjustments, and calibrations.  The program is adjusted,  as necessary, based on the results 
of the PM program.  If a deficiency cannot be corrected under a PM activity, then action 
is taken in accordance with the Corrective Action Program until the deficiency is 
resolved.  When necessary, post-maintenance testing is performed prior to returning 
equipment to service.  
C.  Predictive Maintenance Program 
The Predictive Maintenance Program provides for periodic, proactive testing of selected 
SSCs to identify a decline in performance or in material  condition. Predictive 
maintenance activities assist in assuring that SSCs continue to perform reliably and 
provide additional confidence that the SSC design functional requirements will be 
available when required.  Activities include: periodic lube oil analyses on large motors 
and pumps; vibration analyses of rotating equipment; thermographic analyses of both 
mechanical and electrical  SSCs to identify improper temperature conditions or electrical 
hot spots; acoustic analysis for valve leak-by or SSC leakage;  and motor potential 
diagnostic testing.  Deficiencies identified through the Predictive Maintenance  Program 
are resolved through the Corrective Action Program.  
IV  Configuration Control Program 
Manages and controls changes (procedural and equipment) to the facility to assure the 
plant configuration  and practices correctly reflect the design record file and licensing 
documentation.  
The program includes the §50.59 change control process and incorporates the procedure 
for implementing changes associated with safety-significant  "beyond design basis" 
changes.  
Work Planning  and Scheduling 
This program provides the requirements  and guidelines  "or planning and scheduling 
maintenance and other work activities to optimize plant operational safety, reliability and 
availability.  The program addresses the planning and scheduling of the following 
activities: 
Corrective, preventive, and pre-determined  (i.e., planned or repetitive) maintenance 
On-line maintenance 
Periodic testing 
Installation of design change packages
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Design Change Program 
Establishes  the process for managing the preparation, implementation,  and where 
necessary,  the licensing of design changes to SSCs.  It defines the controls necessary to 
ensure safe implementation of station design changes and provides reasonable, 
commercial  level assurance that changes to the facility are implemented  consistent with 
the information contained in the plant's design record file.  As necessary and appropriate, 
post-modification testing is performed to determine or verify the capability of a modified 
SSC to meet specified functional  design requirements  and design bases before being 
placed in service.  
The design change process for RISC-2  SSCs includes a provision for assessing and 
managing the change in risk from equipment design changes.  
If spare parts are not available from the original equipment manufacturer, an engineering 
evaluation is performed to determine the applicability of alternative suppliers.  The 
evaluation assesses the functional  differences associated with fit, form, function, and 
conditions of service of the equipment or service being supplied.  
Procedure Program 
This element  applies to technical and administrative procedures and includes the 
necessary processes to maintain procedure quality.  The program further establishes  the 
processes for 1) the development, review, and approval of new procedures, procedure 
revisions, procedure changes and procedure deletions, 2) review and approval of vendor 
procedures. The program is designed to assure consistency in the development of new 
procedures,  and in the review and approval of procedure changes.  
V  Procurement Program 
Procurement of SSCs is controlled by administrative procedures that implement quality 
assurance program elements for procurement  and materials management consistent with 
safety and power generation.  These procedures provide reasonable assurance that the 
procurement  specificat.,,ns reflect the appropriate  requirements of the design record file.  
As necessary, and consistent with the safety-significance  or power production 
requirement, the program includes:  vendor surveillance audits and maintenance of 
approved vendor lists, receipt inspection, materials verification activities, special 
handling and storage procedures that are consistent with the information in the design 
record file.  
The procurement specification includes engineering specifications that reflect the design 
record file requirements and include service condition parameters.
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Appendix B 
CHANGES  TO SPECIAL TREATMENT  REQUIREMENTS 
SUBMITTAL OUTLINE 
Table of Contents 
1.  Introduction 
This section would provide a statement of the objective of the submittal 
and identify the unit(s) included in the Option 2 submittal.  It may also 
include a general statement of the approach to be taken, the general 
scope and the anticipated schedule.  
2.  SSC Scope & Approach 
This section would provide an overview of the approach taken 
including any exceptions or supplements to the NEI & regulatory 
guidance.  In addition, this section should include a definition of the 
scope of the special treatment requirements  being modified.  
2.1  Safety-Related  SSCs 
This section would describe the scope of safety-related SSCs to be 
considered in the categorization process.  
2.2  Non-Safety Related SSCs 
This section would describe the scope of non-safety-related  SSCs to be 
considered in the categorization process.  
2.3  Schedule for Implemeit ation 
This section would provide the anticipated schedule  for the 
categorization effort and the schedule for the implementation  of 
changes to the special treatment requirements.  
3.  Categorization Basis 
This section would provide a summary of the categorization bases to be 
used.
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3.1  Plant-Specific Risk Information 
This section would describe the specific risk analyses to be utilized, the 
basis for determining that those analyses are both applicable and 
useful in categorization.  
3.2  Characterization  of PRA Quality 
This section provides the basis for determining that the risk 
information utilized in the categorization is technically capable 
of supporting the categorization process.  The following 
information would be included: 
Internal Events PRA 
"*  A basis for why the internal events PRA reflects the as-built, 
as-operated plant.  
"*  A high level summary of the results of the peer certification 
of the internal events PRA including elements which received 
grades lower than 3.  
"*  The disposition of any peer review fact and observations 
(F&Os) classified as A or B importance.  
"*  Identification of and basis for any sensitivity analyses 
necessary to address identified elements and F&Os.  
Other PRA Analyses 
"*  A basis for why the other PRA analyses adequately reflect 
the as-built, as-operated plant.  
"*  A disposition of the impact of the significant peer review 
findings on the other PRA analyses.  
"*  Identification of and basis for any sensitivity analyses 
necessary to address issues identified in the other PRAs.  
4.  Integrated Decision-making Panel 
This section would provide a summary of the IDP process to be used.  
4.1  Panel Makeup 
This section would describe the makeup  of the IDP: 
"*  Plant Operations  (SRO qualified), 
"*  Design Engineering (including safety analyses), 
"*  Systems Engineering, 
"*  Licensing, and
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*  Probabilistic Risk Assessment.  
In addition, the approach to training the IDP would be described.  
4.2  IDP Guidance 
This section would provide a summary of the plant-specific IDP 
procedures  to be used including the approach to documenting the IDP's 
recommendations  on changing the initial categorization of an SSC.  
5.  Treatment 
This section would provide a summary of the changes in special 
treatment requirements  expected from the categorization.  
5.1  Commercial  Program Summary 
This section would provide a summary of the commercial program to 
be applied to RISC-2 and RISC-3 SSCs.  
6.  Documentation Update 
This section would describe the licensee's approach to updating the 
documentation necessitated by the categorization, including any 
UFSAR changes anticipated.  
7.  Change  Control Process 
This section would provide a summary of change control process to be 
used after the changes in special treatment have been made.  In 
addition, this section will describe the licensee's approach to periodic 
reviews and updates of the categorization and treatment.  
8.  References 
This section would provide a list of the key references expected to be 
used.
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